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The ATT&CK matrix in NODE

Each row is a tactic, in MITRE’s order. The chips are the techniques you use in NODE: open one to see MITRE’s definition, how you do it in the game, and what defenders see. Follow a playbook to light up a whole operation as a route through the matrix, step by step. Mapped to ATT&CK v20.1.

New to ATT&CK? Start with what tactics and techniques are.

Follow a playbook

The ATT&CK Navigator is MITRE’s own tool for exploring and annotating the matrix. These layers put NODE’s coverage, or one playbook’s route, straight into it: useful for teachers, CTF organizers and anyone comparing the game with a course or a real threat report. Open in Navigator loads the layer in MITRE’s tool; Download saves the file to open there later.

Coverage: every technique NODE uses (darker = used by more tools)

Playbooks: one operation, numbered step by step

Every technique on the matrix, with MITRE’s definition, where it happens in NODE and the defender’s view. The ID links to MITRE’s own page.

Enterprise matrix · 91 techniques

T1003

OS Credential Dumping

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

JOHN · Offline Hash Cracking: John the Ripper is the offline cracker. Hydra hits live services and gets noticed. John eats hashes you've already stolen -- usually /etc/shadow after you got root, or hash dumps from compromised databases. More in the wiki

THE HOME PIVOT · From Company to Living Room and Back: The hard target is the company; the soft edge is the employee's house. This playbook walks the full chain from a corporate name to the employee's living room and back into the company as a trusted VPN user. It ties together the residential layer, SIGINT, the ISP OSS console, and the work-laptop pivot. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders never see john -- it runs on your machine, against hashes you already stole. The detection happens at the prior step: did anyone catch you exfiltrating /etc/shadow?

T1003.008

OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

JOHN · Offline Hash Cracking: John the Ripper is the offline cracker. Hydra hits live services and gets noticed. John eats hashes you've already stolen -- usually /etc/shadow after you got root, or hash dumps from compromised databases. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders never see john -- it runs on your machine, against hashes you already stole. The detection happens at the prior step: did anyone catch you exfiltrating /etc/shadow?

T1005

Data from Local System

Collection

MITRE Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WEB SERVER TAKEOVER · T1-T2 Missions -- Bread and Butter: The bread-and-butter NODE op. A bank, corporate, or other organization is running an old web service on a target you've been contracted to breach. Most early missions (STEAL_DATA, DELETE_DATA, MODIFY_RECORDS) are this shape. More in the wiki

What defenders see

From the SOC's view: nmap = port-scan signature (snort/suricata flag), exploit = IDS-flagged payload (most CVE exploits have public Snort rules), shell = anomalous outbound from the web server, logcleaner = the missing-log forensic flag. A SOC running modern tools sees this entire kill chain in a SIEM dashboard within seconds of step 1.

T1018

Remote System Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

NETDISCOVER · ARP-Based LAN Mapping: netdiscover runs ARP scans on the LAN you're connected to -- enumerates every device responding to ARP-Who-Has broadcasts. Returns IP, MAC, vendor (decoded from MAC OUI). Quieter than nmap because ARP doesn't traverse routers and doesn't generate the TCP traffic that triggers IDS. More in the wiki

SNMPWALK · SNMP Enumeration: snmpwalk <ip> queries the SNMP service (port 161/UDP) on network devices -- gateways, switches, routers, printers, IoT devices. Returns the device's MIB (Management Information Base): hostname, OS version, interface stats, ARP table, routing table, sometimes credentials. Default community strings ('public', 'private') still work on shockingly many devices. More in the wiki

WIFI · WPA2 Cracking / Papaya / Deauth: Wireless ops in NODE: wifi_crack --scan enumerates APs on the LAN you're connected to, wifi_crack --capture <essid> grabs the WPA2 4-way handshake, wifi_crack --crack <essid> cracks it offline (GPU-intensive). On crack, the AP enters your exploited_servers and any phones associated to it are revealed. deauth <BSSID> kicks clients to force handshake re-capture; evil_twin <SSID> stands up a rogue AP for captive-portal credential harvest. More in the wiki

Also used in: CISCO, WPA2 PIVOT HEIST

What defenders see

Layer-2 defense: 802.1X authentication on switch ports prevents unknown devices from joining the LAN. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) detects spoofed ARP responses.

T1021.002

Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Lateral Movement

MITRE Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SMBMAP · SMB Share Enumeration: In NODE, smbmap lists the SMB shares on a target and tells you exactly what you can touch. smbmap -H <ip> runs a null session -- you see the share names but mostly NO ACCESS. Feed it credentials you cracked (-u <user> -p <pass>, or it uses creds you already hold for the box) and the READ / READ, WRITE columns light up. More in the wiki

What defenders see

SMB signing, 'restrict anonymous', and removing legacy null-session access shut down unauthenticated enumeration. On the share side, least-privilege NTFS ACLs matter more than the share permission -- smbmap reports the EFFECTIVE access, so an over-broad 'Authenticated Users: Modify' on a finance share is exactly what it finds.

T1021.004

Remote Services: SSH

Lateral Movement

MITRE Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SSH · Secure Shell -- Login, Pivot, Persist: ssh user@<ip> connects with interactive password auth. After hydra cracks credentials or you find them in dumped data, SSH is how you actually log in and use the server. Supports LAN pivoting -- once you SSH to a gateway, ssh from inside that session reaches LAN nodes (e.g. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern SSH defense: key-only auth (passwords disabled), fail2ban for brute-force protection, port-knocking or single-packet-authorization to hide the SSH port entirely, jumphost architectures where direct SSH to production is impossible, MFA on SSH gateways (PAM-based, often paired with Yubikey or TOTP). SOC monitoring: anomalous source IPs, unusual login times, parallel sessions from one user.

T1040

Network Sniffing

Credential AccessDiscovery

MITRE Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MITM · Man-in-the-Middle: Man-in-the-middle puts you between two parties. ARP spoofing redirects traffic through your machine. Plaintext passwords, session cookies, file transfers, anything not encrypted -- you read it. More in the wiki

SIGINT · Signal Decoupler / Cellular Interception: Signal Decoupler unlocks at trust 12 and opens a whole new attack surface: cellular spectrum. The waterfall shows live phone signals across the spectrum; tune in to a signal, lock its IMSI, watch its data stream. Five Signal Integrity (SI) thresholds: 0.3 metadata, 0.5 phone exploit ready, 0.8 stream intercept, 1.0 ghost mode. More in the wiki

CISCO · Switches, Routers and the Gear Between You and the LAN: Two device types run Cisco IOS: MANAGED_SWITCH (Catalyst 2960 / 3750 / 3850 / 9200) and GATEWAY_CISCO (IOS-XE on Catalyst 8200, ISR 4000, ASR 1000). They are reached differently. A managed switch drops you straight into the IOS CLI the moment you connect. More in the wiki

Also used in: MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE, BANK MAINFRAME HEIST

What defenders see

ARP spoofing is one of the oldest attacks and the easiest to detect. Static ARP entries on critical hosts.

T1041

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration

MITRE Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

WEB SERVER TAKEOVER · T1-T2 Missions -- Bread and Butter: The bread-and-butter NODE op. A bank, corporate, or other organization is running an old web service on a target you've been contracted to breach. Most early missions (STEAL_DATA, DELETE_DATA, MODIFY_RECORDS) are this shape. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch for beacon traffic patterns: regular check-in cadence (jittered or not), non-browser User-Agents, certificate pinning anomalies, DNS queries to never-before-seen domains. Mature SOCs run YARA rules on memory dumps to find the beacon's loader.

Added by this wiki: the Field Handbook does not map this step yet.

Added by this wiki: the Field Handbook does not map this step yet.

T1046

Network Service Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

NMAP · Network Mapper: In NODE, nmap <ip> hits the target's open ports. Add -sV for service+version detection -- that's the column you'll match against searchsploit. -sS is stealth SYN, lighter touch. More in the wiki

NETDISCOVER · ARP-Based LAN Mapping: netdiscover runs ARP scans on the LAN you're connected to -- enumerates every device responding to ARP-Who-Has broadcasts. Returns IP, MAC, vendor (decoded from MAC OUI). Quieter than nmap because ARP doesn't traverse routers and doesn't generate the TCP traffic that triggers IDS. More in the wiki

SNMPWALK · SNMP Enumeration: snmpwalk <ip> queries the SNMP service (port 161/UDP) on network devices -- gateways, switches, routers, printers, IoT devices. Returns the device's MIB (Management Information Base): hostname, OS version, interface stats, ARP table, routing table, sometimes credentials. Default community strings ('public', 'private') still work on shockingly many devices. More in the wiki

Also used in: CISCO, WEB SERVER TAKEOVER

What defenders see

A SOC analyst sees a flood of SYN packets across many ports from one source IP. Standard SIEM rules fire on this within seconds -- 'host:src_ip count:ports > 100 in 10s.' Modern endpoint EDR catches scanning faster than network IDS; the tool detects probing patterns before the noise reaches the network sensors.

T1048.003

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Exfiltration

MITRE Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SOC / THE BLUE TEAM · The Defenders You Dox: Behind the tier-3, tier-5, and tier-6 companies sits a hidden blue team: named SOC and incident-response analysts. They are not on the public roster or FaceLink (a SOC handle renders as a minimal locked profile, never a 404), but their accounts live on the company Domain Controller, so john on the DC's shadow cracks them and their real creds authenticate the corp pivot. The IDENTIFY_SOC mission is the dox payoff: pull the SOC roster from the DC and deliver it to an FTP dead drop. More in the wiki

What defenders see

This topic is the defenders. The blue team escalates on your behavior through the vigilance ladder: advisory, deception, hardening, federal referral.

Added by this wiki: the Field Handbook does not map this step yet.

T1053.003

Scheduled Task/Job: Cron

ExecutionPersistencePrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Privesc detection happens at the action layer, not the recon layer. Linpeas itself runs as a normal user; it just reads files.

T1055

Process Injection

StealthPrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

INJECT · Process Memory Injection: inject <pid> <payload> places code into a running process's memory space, executing it under that process's identity and permissions. Used for stealth (your payload runs as 'svchost.exe' or 'systemd' instead of as a new process), persistence (re-injection on reboot via known service PIDs), and privilege exploitation (injecting into a higher-privileged process). Requires already-elevated access on the target. More in the wiki

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern EDR is the defender's primary tool here. Microsoft Defender ATP, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne Singularity all ship behavioral detection for process injection patterns.

T1055.001

Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection

StealthPrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

INJECT · Process Memory Injection: inject <pid> <payload> places code into a running process's memory space, executing it under that process's identity and permissions. Used for stealth (your payload runs as 'svchost.exe' or 'systemd' instead of as a new process), persistence (re-injection on reboot via known service PIDs), and privilege exploitation (injecting into a higher-privileged process). Requires already-elevated access on the target. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern EDR is the defender's primary tool here. Microsoft Defender ATP, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne Singularity all ship behavioral detection for process injection patterns.

T1055.002

Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection

StealthPrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

INJECT · Process Memory Injection: inject <pid> <payload> places code into a running process's memory space, executing it under that process's identity and permissions. Used for stealth (your payload runs as 'svchost.exe' or 'systemd' instead of as a new process), persistence (re-injection on reboot via known service PIDs), and privilege exploitation (injecting into a higher-privileged process). Requires already-elevated access on the target. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern EDR is the defender's primary tool here. Microsoft Defender ATP, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne Singularity all ship behavioral detection for process injection patterns.

T1055.003

Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking

StealthPrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

INJECT · Process Memory Injection: inject <pid> <payload> places code into a running process's memory space, executing it under that process's identity and permissions. Used for stealth (your payload runs as 'svchost.exe' or 'systemd' instead of as a new process), persistence (re-injection on reboot via known service PIDs), and privilege exploitation (injecting into a higher-privileged process). Requires already-elevated access on the target. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern EDR is the defender's primary tool here. Microsoft Defender ATP, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne Singularity all ship behavioral detection for process injection patterns.

T1055.012

Process Injection: Process Hollowing

StealthPrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

INJECT · Process Memory Injection: inject <pid> <payload> places code into a running process's memory space, executing it under that process's identity and permissions. Used for stealth (your payload runs as 'svchost.exe' or 'systemd' instead of as a new process), persistence (re-injection on reboot via known service PIDs), and privilege exploitation (injecting into a higher-privileged process). Requires already-elevated access on the target. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern EDR is the defender's primary tool here. Microsoft Defender ATP, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne Singularity all ship behavioral detection for process injection patterns.

T1059

Command and Scripting Interpreter

Execution

MITRE Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

METASPLOIT · Exploitation Framework: In NODE, metasploit opens msfconsole. Workflow: search <cve> to find a module, use <number> to load it, set RHOSTS <ip> and set RPORT <port> from your nmap output, then exploit. Successful runs drop a session in the sessions tab; sessions -i <id> interacts with one. More in the wiki

SQLMAP · SQL Injection Automation: Sqlmap finds and exploits SQL injection on web targets. In NODE, sqlmap -u http://<ip>/login.php --data=user=admin&pass=test starts the detection phase. Once it confirms injection, --dbs lists databases, --tables -D <dbname> lists tables, --dump -T <table> exfiltrates rows. More in the wiki

WEB SERVER TAKEOVER · T1-T2 Missions -- Bread and Butter: The bread-and-butter NODE op. A bank, corporate, or other organization is running an old web service on a target you've been contracted to breach. Most early missions (STEAL_DATA, DELETE_DATA, MODIFY_RECORDS) are this shape. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Metasploit traffic has signatures. Default payloads, default ports, default URI patterns -- antivirus and EDR products catalog them.

T1059.001

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Execution

MITRE Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

METASPLOIT · Exploitation Framework: In NODE, metasploit opens msfconsole. Workflow: search <cve> to find a module, use <number> to load it, set RHOSTS <ip> and set RPORT <port> from your nmap output, then exploit. Successful runs drop a session in the sessions tab; sessions -i <id> interacts with one. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Metasploit traffic has signatures. Default payloads, default ports, default URI patterns -- antivirus and EDR products catalog them.

T1059.004

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

Execution

MITRE Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

METASPLOIT · Exploitation Framework: In NODE, metasploit opens msfconsole. Workflow: search <cve> to find a module, use <number> to load it, set RHOSTS <ip> and set RPORT <port> from your nmap output, then exploit. Successful runs drop a session in the sessions tab; sessions -i <id> interacts with one. More in the wiki

SQLMAP · SQL Injection Automation: Sqlmap finds and exploits SQL injection on web targets. In NODE, sqlmap -u http://<ip>/login.php --data=user=admin&pass=test starts the detection phase. Once it confirms injection, --dbs lists databases, --tables -D <dbname> lists tables, --dump -T <table> exfiltrates rows. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Metasploit traffic has signatures. Default payloads, default ports, default URI patterns -- antivirus and EDR products catalog them.

T1068

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Privilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

KEXPLOIT · Kernel Exploits: Kernel exploits skip the privesc ladder. CVEs like DirtyCow, DirtyPipe, CopyFail, BlueKeep, EternalBlue, PrintNightmare, Zerologon take you from user_list straight to root. In NODE, kexploit <cve> runs the exploit if your access level qualifies. More in the wiki

SEARCHSPLOIT · Exploit-DB CVE Search: searchsploit <service> queries NODE's local CVE database (assets/exploitdb/exploitdb.json, 32 entries) for known exploits matching a service name or version. Returns CVE IDs, descriptions, and which access level the exploit grants. The output feeds directly into metasploit -- you grab the CVE ID, search <id> inside msfconsole, use it. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Kernel exploits leave fingerprints. The CVE-specific syscall patterns, the panic-recovery sequences, the new SUID binaries created -- defender tooling catches all of these.

T1070

Indicator Removal

Stealth

MITRE Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

LOGS · The Trail You Leave Behind: Every server you touch records you twice. Network logs (the trail TraceManager walks back through your proxy chain) and filesystem logs (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog on the box itself). logcleaner --all handles both layers when you have root (truncates everything, triggers dual-track penalty). More in the wiki

What defenders see

SOC analysts notice missing log entries faster than altered ones. Verizon's DBIR shows median time-to-detect at 207 days but median time-to-contain post-detection at 73 days -- the gap is where attackers operate.

T1070.003

Indicator Removal: Clear Command History

Stealth

MITRE In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

LOGS · The Trail You Leave Behind: Every server you touch records you twice. Network logs (the trail TraceManager walks back through your proxy chain) and filesystem logs (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog on the box itself). logcleaner --all handles both layers when you have root (truncates everything, triggers dual-track penalty). More in the wiki

What defenders see

SOC analysts notice missing log entries faster than altered ones. Verizon's DBIR shows median time-to-detect at 207 days but median time-to-contain post-detection at 73 days -- the gap is where attackers operate.

T1071

Application Layer Protocol

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch for beacon traffic patterns: regular check-in cadence (jittered or not), non-browser User-Agents, certificate pinning anomalies, DNS queries to never-before-seen domains. Mature SOCs run YARA rules on memory dumps to find the beacon's loader.

T1071.001

Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

POSTAL C2 CAMPAIGN · T3+ Missions -- Long-Haul Access: When a target organization can't be reached via internet exploitation (airgapped facilities, hardened external posture, executive-only target with high MFA), the postal route plants hardware physically inside. The insider plugs in a BadUSB or Rubber Duck out of curiosity (or planted gift), the device emulates keyboard/network traffic, deploys a Cobalt beacon, and you have long-haul control from outside. This playbook covers the full chain from target identification to beacon-managed access. More in the wiki

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Mature corporate security blocks USB ports on workstations entirely (Group Policy + endpoint protection). Mail rooms scan packages with X-ray and hand-inspect suspicious electronics.

T1071.004

Application Layer Protocol: DNS

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch for beacon traffic patterns: regular check-in cadence (jittered or not), non-browser User-Agents, certificate pinning anomalies, DNS queries to never-before-seen domains. Mature SOCs run YARA rules on memory dumps to find the beacon's loader.

T1078

Valid Accounts

StealthPersistencePrivilege EscalationInitial Access

MITRE Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MAINFRAME · AIX / SWIFT / BASE24 -- Bank Heist Stack: Bank mainframes run AIX 7.3 -- a UNIX variant from IBM that's been in production at banks for decades. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. The stack is three layers deep: AIX shell at the OS layer, SWIFT Alliance Access 7.3 as a subshell for international wire transfers, BASE24-eps as another subshell for ATM/POS switching. More in the wiki

VPN · Hardware VPN Appliance: Hardware VPN unlocks at the darkmarket. Once connected via vpn --connect, your trace speed drops 5% (0.95x multiplier) -- modest but stacking. The catch: used VPN units have a 35% chance of firmware phone-home (every 48 in-game hours, +0.3 heat per phone-home). More in the wiki

CITRIX NETSCALER · The Citrix ADC / VPN Gateway: In NODE, a Citrix NetScaler is a GATEWAY_NETSCALER box. nmap -sV shows Citrix ADC nsppe on 80/443 and OpenSSH 8.8p1 FreeBSD on 22. Two real Metasploit-reachable CVEs land root: CVE-2019-19781 (Shitrix, path traversal chained to RCE) and CVE-2023-3519 (unauth stack overflow in the SAML/gateway handler, CVSS 9.8). More in the wiki

Also used in: JOHN, pfSENSE FIREWALLS, ADB, SOC / THE BLUE TEAM, THE HOME PIVOT, BANK MAINFRAME HEIST, IOT

What defenders see

Real banks run airgapped SWIFT terminals with hardware tokens, dual-control on every transaction, and hot-tape backups every 15 minutes. Modern AIX deploys use IBM PowerVM partitioning to isolate SWIFT VMs from production.

T1078.001

Valid Accounts: Default Accounts

StealthPersistencePrivilege EscalationInitial Access

MITRE Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SNMPWALK · SNMP Enumeration: snmpwalk <ip> queries the SNMP service (port 161/UDP) on network devices -- gateways, switches, routers, printers, IoT devices. Returns the device's MIB (Management Information Base): hostname, OS version, interface stats, ARP table, routing table, sometimes credentials. Default community strings ('public', 'private') still work on shockingly many devices. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern enterprise SNMP defense: SNMPv3 with auth + privacy, ACLs limiting who can query (only the NMS server), community strings rotated and complex, port 161/UDP firewalled at network boundaries. Wireshark sees SNMP traffic clearly -- a host walking 100K+ OIDs on the network is visibly anomalous.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1110.004 here; T1078.001 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1082

System Information Discovery

Discovery

MITRE An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SNMPWALK · SNMP Enumeration: snmpwalk <ip> queries the SNMP service (port 161/UDP) on network devices -- gateways, switches, routers, printers, IoT devices. Returns the device's MIB (Management Information Base): hostname, OS version, interface stats, ARP table, routing table, sometimes credentials. Default community strings ('public', 'private') still work on shockingly many devices. More in the wiki

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern enterprise SNMP defense: SNMPv3 with auth + privacy, ACLs limiting who can query (only the NMS server), community strings rotated and complex, port 161/UDP firewalled at network boundaries. Wireshark sees SNMP traffic clearly -- a host walking 100K+ OIDs on the network is visibly anomalous.

T1087

Account Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

EMAIL RECON · Open-Source Recon: Write to a target's work address and the mail lands in their real inbox -- open their workstation over RDP (Outlook, Thunderbird, Outlook Express) and it is sitting there, unread. From the MeshMail COMPOSE tab you set the FROM line yourself, so the sender can be anyone: a colleague, a vendor, their own IT. About one send in three reacts. More in the wiki

SOC / THE BLUE TEAM · The Defenders You Dox: Behind the tier-3, tier-5, and tier-6 companies sits a hidden blue team: named SOC and incident-response analysts. They are not on the public roster or FaceLink (a SOC handle renders as a minimal locked profile, never a 404), but their accounts live on the company Domain Controller, so john on the DC's shadow cracks them and their real creds authenticate the corp pivot. The IDENTIFY_SOC mission is the dox payoff: pull the SOC roster from the DC and deliver it to an FTP dead drop. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch the shape of inbound mail, not just its content. One sender hitting many mailboxes in a short window is the classic recon signature, and DLP and mail-flow rules alert on it directly.

T1090

Proxy

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

TUNNEL · SSH Port Forwarding / Bounce Chains: tunnel establishes SSH port forwarding through exploited servers, letting you reach internal services from a position outside their network. tunnel --add <ip> queues a hop, tunnel --connect establishes the chain. Like proxychains, but specifically for inbound services rather than outbound traffic -- you tunnel to expose a remote port locally, then connect to it as if it were on your machine. More in the wiki

PROXYCHAINS · Tunneling Through Compromised Infra: Proxychains routes traffic through compromised infrastructure. Build a chain of servers you've already exploited -- traffic enters at the front, exits at the tail. Defenders see the tail's IP, not yours. More in the wiki

BLOCKCHAIN · Chain Forensics / Blockstream Explorer: Blockstream explorer (node://blockstream.onion) is the tool for CHAIN_TRACE missions. EconomyEngine maintains a blockchain ledger (max 2000 transactions) and blocks (max 500), generated procedurally per block height with deterministic seeds. Address tags categorize: SHELL (corporate front), SUSPECT (likely-criminal), CORPORATE (legitimate), CHAIN (intermediate hop). More in the wiki

What defenders see

SSH tunneling is hard to defend against because it's traffic-indistinguishable from legitimate SSH. Defenders rely on: outbound firewall rules (only specific destinations allowed for SSH), DLP scanning on tunneled traffic, behavioral detection of long-running SSH sessions with high bandwidth (legitimate admin sessions are usually short and low-volume), and zero-trust architectures that authenticate every internal hop.

T1090.003

Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PROXYCHAINS · Tunneling Through Compromised Infra: Proxychains routes traffic through compromised infrastructure. Build a chain of servers you've already exploited -- traffic enters at the front, exits at the tail. Defenders see the tail's IP, not yours. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Proxy chains complicate but don't prevent attribution. Each hop is a server with logs (or a deliberately log-less host run by a known criminal infrastructure).

T1091

Replication Through Removable Media

Lateral MovementInitial Access

MITRE Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

POSTAL C2 CAMPAIGN · T3+ Missions -- Long-Haul Access: When a target organization can't be reached via internet exploitation (airgapped facilities, hardened external posture, executive-only target with high MFA), the postal route plants hardware physically inside. The insider plugs in a BadUSB or Rubber Duck out of curiosity (or planted gift), the device emulates keyboard/network traffic, deploys a Cobalt beacon, and you have long-haul control from outside. This playbook covers the full chain from target identification to beacon-managed access. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Mature corporate security blocks USB ports on workstations entirely (Group Policy + endpoint protection). Mail rooms scan packages with X-ray and hand-inspect suspicious electronics.

T1098

Account Manipulation

PersistencePrivilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

ISP OSS/BSS CONSOLE · The Carrier's Operator Panel: The ISP customer-database box doubles as the carrier's OSS/BSS operator console, reachable in the NODE browser. nmap labels its web port as the operator portal, and a sqlmap --dump of its subscriber table points you at it too. Open it on any breach foothold (even sqlmap's database_root), or sign in at the web gate with a weak NOC default or hydra --url. Inside are nine tabs: a Dashboard with live poller graphs, a Subscribers directory searchable by name, account, IP, MAC, phone, address, or employer domain (every row already shows the home IP), a Network view, Provisioning, Billing, Support, DNS/DHCP, an Audit log, and Lawful Intercept. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Carriers monitor OSS/BSS access with their own SIEM, NOC change-audit, and privileged-access management; an operator account logging in from an unexpected source, or provisioning an unbilled line, is exactly what anomaly detection flags. Lawful-intercept systems are audited under legal oversight, so an unauthorized tap is high-severity.

T1105

Ingress Tool Transfer

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WORM · Self-Propagating Infection: worm --spread <ip> propagates infection from a server you've already rooted to its LAN neighbors. 75% base success per attempt, -5% per tier above the source. Max two generations of propagation per worm kit -- spreads to neighbors, neighbors spread to their neighbors, then it stops. Combined with infect for botnet growth or with inject for fileless persistence at scale. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern worm defense relies on segmentation more than detection -- once a worm is loose, the time-to-quarantine is critical. Microsegmentation (Illumio, Akamai Guardicore, Cisco SD-Access) limits lateral movement at the kernel/firewall level.

T1110

Brute Force

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

HYDRA · Online Brute Force: In NODE, hydra brute-forces credentials against live services. Syntax: hydra ssh://<ip> for SSH, ftp://, telnet://. Web admin panels use hydra --url http://<ip>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Authentication failure logs are the loudest thing in any SIEM. Failed-login spikes from one source IP fire alerts in seconds.

T1110.001

Brute Force: Password Guessing

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

HYDRA · Online Brute Force: In NODE, hydra brute-forces credentials against live services. Syntax: hydra ssh://<ip> for SSH, ftp://, telnet://. Web admin panels use hydra --url http://<ip>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Authentication failure logs are the loudest thing in any SIEM. Failed-login spikes from one source IP fire alerts in seconds.

T1110.002

Brute Force: Password Cracking

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

JOHN · Offline Hash Cracking: John the Ripper is the offline cracker. Hydra hits live services and gets noticed. John eats hashes you've already stolen -- usually /etc/shadow after you got root, or hash dumps from compromised databases. More in the wiki

WIFI · WPA2 Cracking / Papaya / Deauth: Wireless ops in NODE: wifi_crack --scan enumerates APs on the LAN you're connected to, wifi_crack --capture <essid> grabs the WPA2 4-way handshake, wifi_crack --crack <essid> cracks it offline (GPU-intensive). On crack, the AP enters your exploited_servers and any phones associated to it are revealed. deauth <BSSID> kicks clients to force handshake re-capture; evil_twin <SSID> stands up a rogue AP for captive-portal credential harvest. More in the wiki

WPA2 PIVOT HEIST · T2-T3 Missions -- Outside to Inside: When the wired network is too hardened for direct attack, the access point is the backdoor. This playbook covers reaching mobile devices (phones, tablets) that aren't visible from the public internet but ARE associated to a wireless AP on a LAN you've already breached. The AP itself is the gateway you crack; the phones connected to it are revealed only after the crack succeeds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders never see john -- it runs on your machine, against hashes you already stole. The detection happens at the prior step: did anyone catch you exfiltrating /etc/shadow?

T1110.003

Brute Force: Password Spraying

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

HYDRA · Online Brute Force: In NODE, hydra brute-forces credentials against live services. Syntax: hydra ssh://<ip> for SSH, ftp://, telnet://. Web admin panels use hydra --url http://<ip>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Authentication failure logs are the loudest thing in any SIEM. Failed-login spikes from one source IP fire alerts in seconds.

T1133

External Remote Services

PersistenceInitial Access

MITRE Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

VPN · Hardware VPN Appliance: Hardware VPN unlocks at the darkmarket. Once connected via vpn --connect, your trace speed drops 5% (0.95x multiplier) -- modest but stacking. The catch: used VPN units have a 35% chance of firmware phone-home (every 48 in-game hours, +0.3 heat per phone-home). More in the wiki

pfSENSE FIREWALLS · The FreeBSD firewall with a numbered console: In NODE, a pfSense box is a GATEWAY_FIREWALL whose service is pfSense (the other firewalls are FortiOS). nmap -sV shows pfSense WebGUI on 443/8443 and a FreeBSD OS guess. Three real pfSense CVEs are in the exploitdb: CVE-2021-41282 (root), CVE-2023-42326 (user), and CVE-2022-31814 (pfBlockerNG). More in the wiki

ADB · Android Debug Bridge Exploitation: adb_exploit <ip> targets Android devices that have ADB exposed. Grants root shell access without a screen unlock. Use --bypass-fmd to defeat Find My Device on stolen-handset workflows. More in the wiki

Also used in: THE HOME PIVOT

What defenders see

Modern VPN defenders monitor for: lateral movement post-connection (a VPN session that scans the internal network is suspicious), client-version anomalies (unpatched clients), unusual geography. EDR products correlate VPN session times with endpoint activity to detect 'impossible travel.' Mature programs run zero-trust architectures where the VPN no longer grants implicit network access -- every internal request is re-authenticated.

T1135

Network Share Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SMBMAP · SMB Share Enumeration: In NODE, smbmap lists the SMB shares on a target and tells you exactly what you can touch. smbmap -H <ip> runs a null session -- you see the share names but mostly NO ACCESS. Feed it credentials you cracked (-u <user> -p <pass>, or it uses creds you already hold for the box) and the READ / READ, WRITE columns light up. More in the wiki

What defenders see

SMB signing, 'restrict anonymous', and removing legacy null-session access shut down unauthenticated enumeration. On the share side, least-privilege NTFS ACLs matter more than the share permission -- smbmap reports the EFFECTIVE access, so an over-broad 'Authenticated Users: Modify' on a finance share is exactly what it finds.

T1136

Create Account

Persistence

MITRE Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

ISP OSS/BSS CONSOLE · The Carrier's Operator Panel: The ISP customer-database box doubles as the carrier's OSS/BSS operator console, reachable in the NODE browser. nmap labels its web port as the operator portal, and a sqlmap --dump of its subscriber table points you at it too. Open it on any breach foothold (even sqlmap's database_root), or sign in at the web gate with a weak NOC default or hydra --url. Inside are nine tabs: a Dashboard with live poller graphs, a Subscribers directory searchable by name, account, IP, MAC, phone, address, or employer domain (every row already shows the home IP), a Network view, Provisioning, Billing, Support, DNS/DHCP, an Audit log, and Lawful Intercept. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Carriers monitor OSS/BSS access with their own SIEM, NOC change-audit, and privileged-access management; an operator account logging in from an unexpected source, or provisioning an unbilled line, is exactly what anomaly detection flags. Lawful-intercept systems are audited under legal oversight, so an unauthorized tap is high-severity.

T1190

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MAINFRAME · AIX / SWIFT / BASE24 -- Bank Heist Stack: Bank mainframes run AIX 7.3 -- a UNIX variant from IBM that's been in production at banks for decades. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. The stack is three layers deep: AIX shell at the OS layer, SWIFT Alliance Access 7.3 as a subshell for international wire transfers, BASE24-eps as another subshell for ATM/POS switching. More in the wiki

VPN · Hardware VPN Appliance: Hardware VPN unlocks at the darkmarket. Once connected via vpn --connect, your trace speed drops 5% (0.95x multiplier) -- modest but stacking. The catch: used VPN units have a 35% chance of firmware phone-home (every 48 in-game hours, +0.3 heat per phone-home). More in the wiki

CITRIX NETSCALER · The Citrix ADC / VPN Gateway: In NODE, a Citrix NetScaler is a GATEWAY_NETSCALER box. nmap -sV shows Citrix ADC nsppe on 80/443 and OpenSSH 8.8p1 FreeBSD on 22. Two real Metasploit-reachable CVEs land root: CVE-2019-19781 (Shitrix, path traversal chained to RCE) and CVE-2023-3519 (unauth stack overflow in the SAML/gateway handler, CVSS 9.8). More in the wiki

Also used in: SEARCHSPLOIT, METASPLOIT, HYDRA, SQLMAP, pfSENSE FIREWALLS, BANK MAINFRAME HEIST, WEB SERVER TAKEOVER, IOT

What defenders see

Real banks run airgapped SWIFT terminals with hardware tokens, dual-control on every transaction, and hot-tape backups every 15 minutes. Modern AIX deploys use IBM PowerVM partitioning to isolate SWIFT VMs from production.

T1200

Hardware Additions

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SIGINT · Signal Decoupler / Cellular Interception: Signal Decoupler unlocks at trust 12 and opens a whole new attack surface: cellular spectrum. The waterfall shows live phone signals across the spectrum; tune in to a signal, lock its IMSI, watch its data stream. Five Signal Integrity (SI) thresholds: 0.3 metadata, 0.5 phone exploit ready, 0.8 stream intercept, 1.0 ghost mode. More in the wiki

IOT · CCTV / Printer / PLC Manipulation: IoT in NODE means three categories of weak embedded devices: CCTV (running busybox, default creds, cctv_view/cctv_disable/cctv_loop to hijack), printers (printjack dumps the print spool for credential leaks), and industrial PLCs (overload sabotages SCADA registers). Each lives behind gateway switches and shows up via netdiscover after you've reached the LAN. Most have firmware unchanged for years -- DirtyCow-era kernels, default admin passwords, no segmentation from the corporate network. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cellular providers run anomaly detection on IMSI catchers (sudden cluster of phones registering with one tower, signal-strength patterns inconsistent with terrain). Modern handsets warn users about LTE-to-2G downgrade attacks.

T1210

Exploitation of Remote Services

Lateral Movement

MITRE Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

HONEYPOTS · Decoy servers: In NODE, some tier 3+ networks plant a decoy server that looks like a normal box in /etc/hosts and on the switch but exists only to catch you. Government and corporate nets run them most -- at most one per network, with a name and type that change each time so you cannot guess the next one. You spot it with nmap -sV -O: an impossible service mix (Windows IIS and Linux Samba, MSSQL and MySQL at once), a Service Info: OSs: Windows, Linux line, nmap's own Device: honeypot? flag, and a low-confidence, inconsistent OS fingerprint. More in the wiki

WORM · Self-Propagating Infection: worm --spread <ip> propagates infection from a server you've already rooted to its LAN neighbors. 75% base success per attempt, -5% per tier above the source. Max two generations of propagation per worm kit -- spreads to neighbors, neighbors spread to their neighbors, then it stops. Combined with infect for botnet growth or with inject for fileless persistence at scale. More in the wiki

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

Also used in: IOT

What defenders see

You are the one being profiled. A honeypot records the source of every probe and alerts the moment you connect, so a hit on one is a strong signal that the whole network is now watching for you.

T1213

Data from Information Repositories

Collection

MITRE Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SQLMAP · SQL Injection Automation: Sqlmap finds and exploits SQL injection on web targets. In NODE, sqlmap -u http://<ip>/login.php --data=user=admin&pass=test starts the detection phase. Once it confirms injection, --dbs lists databases, --tables -D <dbname> lists tables, --dump -T <table> exfiltrates rows. More in the wiki

What defenders see

WAFs (Web Application Firewalls) are the first line. Cloudflare, AWS WAF, Imperva all have signature sets that catch sqlmap's default payloads instantly -- they're on every block list.

T1219

Remote Access Tools

Command and Control

MITRE An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

POSTAL C2 CAMPAIGN · T3+ Missions -- Long-Haul Access: When a target organization can't be reached via internet exploitation (airgapped facilities, hardened external posture, executive-only target with high MFA), the postal route plants hardware physically inside. The insider plugs in a BadUSB or Rubber Duck out of curiosity (or planted gift), the device emulates keyboard/network traffic, deploys a Cobalt beacon, and you have long-haul control from outside. This playbook covers the full chain from target identification to beacon-managed access. More in the wiki

COBALT · Command & Control: Cobalt Strike C2 unlocks at trust 9 from the darkmarket. Buy your hosting domain (1.5 BTC, .ru bulletproof.host suffix), buy modules at 0.75 BTC apiece, then deploy beacons to exploited servers (cap 50). Beacons check in every 10s tick. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Mature corporate security blocks USB ports on workstations entirely (Group Policy + endpoint protection). Mail rooms scan packages with X-ray and hand-inspect suspicious electronics.

T1496

Resource Hijacking

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MINING · Stealth Cryptominers: Mining unlocks at trust 8 via miner --install on a server you already root. The miner runs in the background, slowly accumulating BTC over hours. Each miner has a per-game-hour detection probability; on detection, you keep 85% of mined BTC (tainted) plus +0.5 heat plus a news bulletin. More in the wiki

IOT · CCTV / Printer / PLC Manipulation: IoT in NODE means three categories of weak embedded devices: CCTV (running busybox, default creds, cctv_view/cctv_disable/cctv_loop to hijack), printers (printjack dumps the print spool for credential leaks), and industrial PLCs (overload sabotages SCADA registers). Each lives behind gateway switches and shows up via netdiscover after you've reached the LAN. Most have firmware unchanged for years -- DirtyCow-era kernels, default admin passwords, no segmentation from the corporate network. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern endpoint protection ships with cryptojacking heuristics: sustained CPU >80% with non-business processes, DNS queries to known mining pools (xmr-stak, supportxmr, minexmr), specific binary fingerprints. Cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP) auto-flag instances showing mining patterns and either suspend or charge attackers' stolen credit cards.

T1498

Network Denial of Service

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cloudflare, Akamai, Imperva run continuous DDoS scrubbing for paying customers -- their networks absorb hundreds of gigabits-per-second of attack traffic. ISP-level mitigation (uplink filtering, BGP blackholing) intercepts traffic before it reaches the target.

T1498.001

Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cloudflare, Akamai, Imperva run continuous DDoS scrubbing for paying customers -- their networks absorb hundreds of gigabits-per-second of attack traffic. ISP-level mitigation (uplink filtering, BGP blackholing) intercepts traffic before it reaches the target.

T1498.002

Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cloudflare, Akamai, Imperva run continuous DDoS scrubbing for paying customers -- their networks absorb hundreds of gigabits-per-second of attack traffic. ISP-level mitigation (uplink filtering, BGP blackholing) intercepts traffic before it reaches the target.

T1499.004

Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WIFI · WPA2 Cracking / Papaya / Deauth: Wireless ops in NODE: wifi_crack --scan enumerates APs on the LAN you're connected to, wifi_crack --capture <essid> grabs the WPA2 4-way handshake, wifi_crack --crack <essid> cracks it offline (GPU-intensive). On crack, the AP enters your exploited_servers and any phones associated to it are revealed. deauth <BSSID> kicks clients to force handshake re-capture; evil_twin <SSID> stands up a rogue AP for captive-portal credential harvest. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern enterprise WiFi defenses: WPA3-Enterprise with SAE, EAP-TLS with client certificates (defeats password capture entirely), 802.11w management frame protection (defeats deauth), wireless intrusion detection (WIDS) that flags rogue APs by BSSID anomalies and RF fingerprints. Apple, Google, Microsoft phones increasingly use Private MAC Addresses to defeat tracking.

T1548

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Privilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control privilege elevation to gain higher-level permissions. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Privesc detection happens at the action layer, not the recon layer. Linpeas itself runs as a normal user; it just reads files.

T1548.001

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid

Privilege Escalation

MITRE An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Privesc detection happens at the action layer, not the recon layer. Linpeas itself runs as a normal user; it just reads files.

T1548.002

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control

Privilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on a system. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Privesc detection happens at the action layer, not the recon layer. Linpeas itself runs as a normal user; it just reads files.

T1548.003

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching

Privilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PRIVESC · Privilege Escalation: Privesc is the phase between 'I have a shell' and 'I have root.' In NODE the access ladder is user_list -> user -> filesystem -> database_root -> root. Most missions need the top. Linux: linpeas enumerates, then sudo <vector>. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Privesc detection happens at the action layer, not the recon layer. Linpeas itself runs as a normal user; it just reads files.

T1552.001

Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

CITRIX NETSCALER · The Citrix ADC / VPN Gateway: In NODE, a Citrix NetScaler is a GATEWAY_NETSCALER box. nmap -sV shows Citrix ADC nsppe on 80/443 and OpenSSH 8.8p1 FreeBSD on 22. Two real Metasploit-reachable CVEs land root: CVE-2019-19781 (Shitrix, path traversal chained to RCE) and CVE-2023-3519 (unauth stack overflow in the SAML/gateway handler, CVSS 9.8). More in the wiki

pfSENSE FIREWALLS · The FreeBSD firewall with a numbered console: In NODE, a pfSense box is a GATEWAY_FIREWALL whose service is pfSense (the other firewalls are FortiOS). nmap -sV shows pfSense WebGUI on 443/8443 and a FreeBSD OS guess. Three real pfSense CVEs are in the exploitdb: CVE-2021-41282 (root), CVE-2023-42326 (user), and CVE-2022-31814 (pfBlockerNG). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Detection is easy in principle and hard in practice. Shitrix requests contain /vpn/../vpns in the URL, and every commercial IDS ruleset ships a signature for it -- but in 2020 many boxes were unpatched and log volume made hits look like noise.

T1552.004

Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys

Credential Access

MITRE Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SSH · Secure Shell -- Login, Pivot, Persist: ssh user@<ip> connects with interactive password auth. After hydra cracks credentials or you find them in dumped data, SSH is how you actually log in and use the server. Supports LAN pivoting -- once you SSH to a gateway, ssh from inside that session reaches LAN nodes (e.g. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern SSH defense: key-only auth (passwords disabled), fail2ban for brute-force protection, port-knocking or single-packet-authorization to hide the SSH port entirely, jumphost architectures where direct SSH to production is impossible, MFA on SSH gateways (PAM-based, often paired with Yubikey or TOTP). SOC monitoring: anomalous source IPs, unusual login times, parallel sessions from one user.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1550 here; T1552.004 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1557

Adversary-in-the-Middle

Credential AccessCollection

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MITM · Man-in-the-Middle: Man-in-the-middle puts you between two parties. ARP spoofing redirects traffic through your machine. Plaintext passwords, session cookies, file transfers, anything not encrypted -- you read it. More in the wiki

WIFI · WPA2 Cracking / Papaya / Deauth: Wireless ops in NODE: wifi_crack --scan enumerates APs on the LAN you're connected to, wifi_crack --capture <essid> grabs the WPA2 4-way handshake, wifi_crack --crack <essid> cracks it offline (GPU-intensive). On crack, the AP enters your exploited_servers and any phones associated to it are revealed. deauth <BSSID> kicks clients to force handshake re-capture; evil_twin <SSID> stands up a rogue AP for captive-portal credential harvest. More in the wiki

ISP OSS/BSS CONSOLE · The Carrier's Operator Panel: The ISP customer-database box doubles as the carrier's OSS/BSS operator console, reachable in the NODE browser. nmap labels its web port as the operator portal, and a sqlmap --dump of its subscriber table points you at it too. Open it on any breach foothold (even sqlmap's database_root), or sign in at the web gate with a weak NOC default or hydra --url. Inside are nine tabs: a Dashboard with live poller graphs, a Subscribers directory searchable by name, account, IP, MAC, phone, address, or employer domain (every row already shows the home IP), a Network view, Provisioning, Billing, Support, DNS/DHCP, an Audit log, and Lawful Intercept. More in the wiki

What defenders see

ARP spoofing is one of the oldest attacks and the easiest to detect. Static ARP entries on critical hosts.

T1557.002

Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning

Credential AccessCollection

MITRE Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MITM · Man-in-the-Middle: Man-in-the-middle puts you between two parties. ARP spoofing redirects traffic through your machine. Plaintext passwords, session cookies, file transfers, anything not encrypted -- you read it. More in the wiki

NETDISCOVER · ARP-Based LAN Mapping: netdiscover runs ARP scans on the LAN you're connected to -- enumerates every device responding to ARP-Who-Has broadcasts. Returns IP, MAC, vendor (decoded from MAC OUI). Quieter than nmap because ARP doesn't traverse routers and doesn't generate the TCP traffic that triggers IDS. More in the wiki

WPA2 PIVOT HEIST · T2-T3 Missions -- Outside to Inside: When the wired network is too hardened for direct attack, the access point is the backdoor. This playbook covers reaching mobile devices (phones, tablets) that aren't visible from the public internet but ARE associated to a wireless AP on a LAN you've already breached. The AP itself is the gateway you crack; the phones connected to it are revealed only after the crack succeeds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

ARP spoofing is one of the oldest attacks and the easiest to detect. Static ARP entries on critical hosts.

T1557.004

Adversary-in-the-Middle: Evil Twin

Credential AccessCollection

MITRE Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or Input Capture. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

EVIL_TWIN · Rogue WiFi AP: Evil twin is a rogue AP that mimics a target's WiFi. They connect, you own the link. Common play: deauth the legitimate AP, broadcast a clone with the same SSID, intercept the WPA handshake when victims reconnect. More in the wiki

WIFI · WPA2 Cracking / Papaya / Deauth: Wireless ops in NODE: wifi_crack --scan enumerates APs on the LAN you're connected to, wifi_crack --capture <essid> grabs the WPA2 4-way handshake, wifi_crack --crack <essid> cracks it offline (GPU-intensive). On crack, the AP enters your exploited_servers and any phones associated to it are revealed. deauth <BSSID> kicks clients to force handshake re-capture; evil_twin <SSID> stands up a rogue AP for captive-portal credential harvest. More in the wiki

WPA2 PIVOT HEIST · T2-T3 Missions -- Outside to Inside: When the wired network is too hardened for direct attack, the access point is the backdoor. This playbook covers reaching mobile devices (phones, tablets) that aren't visible from the public internet but ARE associated to a wireless AP on a LAN you've already breached. The AP itself is the gateway you crack; the phones connected to it are revealed only after the crack succeeds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Wireless IDS systems (Aruba, Cisco WIDS, Mojo) detect evil twins by monitoring for: rogue APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs, deauth bursts (unmistakable signature), MAC address mismatches between expected APs. Enterprise WiFi uses 802.1X with mutual authentication: the AP proves itself to the client via certificate.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1557.003 here; T1557.004 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1557.003 here; T1557.004 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1557.003 here; T1557.004 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1565.001

Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

BANK MAINFRAME HEIST · T5-T6 Capstone -- The Endgame: The capstone playbook -- demonstrates SIGINT, AIX, SWIFT, BASE24, and economy systems working together. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. Multi-stage: SIGINT for MFA intercept, AIX for OS access, mirror-break for SWIFT writability, SWIFT for transfer redirect, BASE24 for ATM cashout. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Real banks run multi-layer defense. Network: airgapped SWIFT terminals, hardware tokens for every transaction, dual-control sign-off.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1561.002 here; T1565.001 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1566

Phishing

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PHISHING · Social Engineering: Two phishing paths. Single target: phish <phone_ip> --template <name> from the terminal. Five templates -- password_reset, package_delivery, calendar_invite, ceo_urgent, mfa_expired -- with base success 45-65% on tier 1, dropping 6-10% per tier above that. More in the wiki

EMAIL RECON · Open-Source Recon: Write to a target's work address and the mail lands in their real inbox -- open their workstation over RDP (Outlook, Thunderbird, Outlook Express) and it is sitting there, unread. From the MeshMail COMPOSE tab you set the FROM line yourself, so the sender can be anyone: a colleague, a vendor, their own IT. About one send in three reacts. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Email gateways (Mimecast, Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365) catch most generic phishing in the inbox. Spear phishing slips through more often.

T1566.001

Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PHISHING · Social Engineering: Two phishing paths. Single target: phish <phone_ip> --template <name> from the terminal. Five templates -- password_reset, package_delivery, calendar_invite, ceo_urgent, mfa_expired -- with base success 45-65% on tier 1, dropping 6-10% per tier above that. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Email gateways (Mimecast, Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365) catch most generic phishing in the inbox. Spear phishing slips through more often.

T1566.002

Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PHISHING · Social Engineering: Two phishing paths. Single target: phish <phone_ip> --template <name> from the terminal. Five templates -- password_reset, package_delivery, calendar_invite, ceo_urgent, mfa_expired -- with base success 45-65% on tier 1, dropping 6-10% per tier above that. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Email gateways (Mimecast, Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365) catch most generic phishing in the inbox. Spear phishing slips through more often.

T1566.003

Phishing: Spearphishing via Service

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PHISHING · Social Engineering: Two phishing paths. Single target: phish <phone_ip> --template <name> from the terminal. Five templates -- password_reset, package_delivery, calendar_invite, ceo_urgent, mfa_expired -- with base success 45-65% on tier 1, dropping 6-10% per tier above that. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Email gateways (Mimecast, Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365) catch most generic phishing in the inbox. Spear phishing slips through more often.

T1570

Lateral Tool Transfer

Lateral Movement

MITRE Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WORM · Self-Propagating Infection: worm --spread <ip> propagates infection from a server you've already rooted to its LAN neighbors. 75% base success per attempt, -5% per tier above the source. Max two generations of propagation per worm kit -- spreads to neighbors, neighbors spread to their neighbors, then it stops. Combined with infect for botnet growth or with inject for fileless persistence at scale. More in the wiki

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern worm defense relies on segmentation more than detection -- once a worm is loose, the time-to-quarantine is critical. Microsegmentation (Illumio, Akamai Guardicore, Cisco SD-Access) limits lateral movement at the kernel/firewall level.

T1572

Protocol Tunneling

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

TUNNEL · SSH Port Forwarding / Bounce Chains: tunnel establishes SSH port forwarding through exploited servers, letting you reach internal services from a position outside their network. tunnel --add <ip> queues a hop, tunnel --connect establishes the chain. Like proxychains, but specifically for inbound services rather than outbound traffic -- you tunnel to expose a remote port locally, then connect to it as if it were on your machine. More in the wiki

SSH · Secure Shell -- Login, Pivot, Persist: ssh user@<ip> connects with interactive password auth. After hydra cracks credentials or you find them in dumped data, SSH is how you actually log in and use the server. Supports LAN pivoting -- once you SSH to a gateway, ssh from inside that session reaches LAN nodes (e.g. More in the wiki

What defenders see

SSH tunneling is hard to defend against because it's traffic-indistinguishable from legitimate SSH. Defenders rely on: outbound firewall rules (only specific destinations allowed for SSH), DLP scanning on tunneled traffic, behavioral detection of long-running SSH sessions with high bandwidth (legitimate admin sessions are usually short and low-volume), and zero-trust architectures that authenticate every internal hop.

T1573

Encrypted Channel

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PROXYCHAINS · Tunneling Through Compromised Infra: Proxychains routes traffic through compromised infrastructure. Build a chain of servers you've already exploited -- traffic enters at the front, exits at the tail. Defenders see the tail's IP, not yours. More in the wiki

BLOCKCHAIN · Chain Forensics / Blockstream Explorer: Blockstream explorer (node://blockstream.onion) is the tool for CHAIN_TRACE missions. EconomyEngine maintains a blockchain ledger (max 2000 transactions) and blocks (max 500), generated procedurally per block height with deterministic seeds. Address tags categorize: SHELL (corporate front), SUSPECT (likely-criminal), CORPORATE (legitimate), CHAIN (intermediate hop). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Proxy chains complicate but don't prevent attribution. Each hop is a server with logs (or a deliberately log-less host run by a known criminal infrastructure).

T1583.005

Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet

Resource Development

MITRE Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DDOS CONTRACT · T2-T4 Missions -- Recurring Revenue: DDoS contracts are the recurring-revenue side of NODE -- once you've grown a botnet, you can rent its capacity to NPCs (booter service) or use it for [WORLD] missions targeting city infrastructure. This playbook covers from first infection to active cashflow. Trust 15+ unlocks DDoS missions; mining trust 8 also helps for managing CSI (Cyber-Security Index). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cloudflare, Akamai, Imperva run continuous DDoS scrubbing for paying customers -- their networks absorb hundreds of gigabits-per-second of attack traffic. ISP-level mitigation (uplink filtering, BGP blackholing) intercepts traffic before it reaches the target.

T1584

Compromise Infrastructure

Resource Development

MITRE Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

ISP OSS/BSS CONSOLE · The Carrier's Operator Panel: The ISP customer-database box doubles as the carrier's OSS/BSS operator console, reachable in the NODE browser. nmap labels its web port as the operator portal, and a sqlmap --dump of its subscriber table points you at it too. Open it on any breach foothold (even sqlmap's database_root), or sign in at the web gate with a weak NOC default or hydra --url. Inside are nine tabs: a Dashboard with live poller graphs, a Subscribers directory searchable by name, account, IP, MAC, phone, address, or employer domain (every row already shows the home IP), a Network view, Provisioning, Billing, Support, DNS/DHCP, an Audit log, and Lawful Intercept. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Carriers monitor OSS/BSS access with their own SIEM, NOC change-audit, and privileged-access management; an operator account logging in from an unexpected source, or provisioning an unbilled line, is exactly what anomaly detection flags. Lawful-intercept systems are audited under legal oversight, so an unauthorized tap is high-severity.

T1588.001

Obtain Capabilities: Malware

Resource Development

MITRE Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

POSTAL C2 CAMPAIGN · T3+ Missions -- Long-Haul Access: When a target organization can't be reached via internet exploitation (airgapped facilities, hardened external posture, executive-only target with high MFA), the postal route plants hardware physically inside. The insider plugs in a BadUSB or Rubber Duck out of curiosity (or planted gift), the device emulates keyboard/network traffic, deploys a Cobalt beacon, and you have long-haul control from outside. This playbook covers the full chain from target identification to beacon-managed access. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Mature corporate security blocks USB ports on workstations entirely (Group Policy + endpoint protection). Mail rooms scan packages with X-ray and hand-inspect suspicious electronics.

T1588.005

Obtain Capabilities: Exploits

Resource Development

MITRE Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SEARCHSPLOIT · Exploit-DB CVE Search: searchsploit <service> queries NODE's local CVE database (assets/exploitdb/exploitdb.json, 32 entries) for known exploits matching a service name or version. Returns CVE IDs, descriptions, and which access level the exploit grants. The output feeds directly into metasploit -- you grab the CVE ID, search <id> inside msfconsole, use it. More in the wiki

WEB SERVER TAKEOVER · T1-T2 Missions -- Bread and Butter: The bread-and-butter NODE op. A bank, corporate, or other organization is running an old web service on a target you've been contracted to breach. Most early missions (STEAL_DATA, DELETE_DATA, MODIFY_RECORDS) are this shape. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders use the exact same database to prioritize patching. CISA's KEV catalog (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) is essentially 'the searchsploit subset that's actively being used.' Mature SOC programs subscribe to vendor CVE feeds and auto-correlate with their internal asset inventory -- 'we run Apache 2.4.49 on these 12 servers, and CVE-2021-41773 is in KEV, patch deadline next Monday.' Vulnerability scanners (Nessus, OpenVAS, Qualys) effectively run continuous searchsploit lookups against monitored environments.

T1589

Gather Victim Identity Information

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

EMAIL RECON · Open-Source Recon: Write to a target's work address and the mail lands in their real inbox -- open their workstation over RDP (Outlook, Thunderbird, Outlook Express) and it is sitting there, unread. From the MeshMail COMPOSE tab you set the FROM line yourself, so the sender can be anyone: a colleague, a vendor, their own IT. About one send in three reacts. More in the wiki

SOC / THE BLUE TEAM · The Defenders You Dox: Behind the tier-3, tier-5, and tier-6 companies sits a hidden blue team: named SOC and incident-response analysts. They are not on the public roster or FaceLink (a SOC handle renders as a minimal locked profile, never a 404), but their accounts live on the company Domain Controller, so john on the DC's shadow cracks them and their real creds authenticate the corp pivot. The IDENTIFY_SOC mission is the dox payoff: pull the SOC roster from the DC and deliver it to an FTP dead drop. More in the wiki

THE HOME PIVOT · From Company to Living Room and Back: The hard target is the company; the soft edge is the employee's house. This playbook walks the full chain from a corporate name to the employee's living room and back into the company as a trusted VPN user. It ties together the residential layer, SIGINT, the ISP OSS console, and the work-laptop pivot. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch the shape of inbound mail, not just its content. One sender hitting many mailboxes in a short window is the classic recon signature, and DLP and mail-flow rules alert on it directly.

T1590

Gather Victim Network Information

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DIG · DNS Recon & Encoded Breadcrumbs: In NODE, dig <domain> queries the registrar for a domain's DNS records. dig <domain> TXT is the one that matters -- TXT records hold flavor, and on some domains an encoded string an admin thought nobody would read. dig <domain> ANY dumps everything; dig +short gives just the values (pipe-friendly); dig -x <ip> does reverse. More in the wiki

What defenders see

DNS queries to a public resolver are normal traffic; a single dig is invisible. What defenders watch for is bulk enumeration -- hundreds of subdomain guesses (dictionary/brute DNS), or AXFR zone-transfer attempts, which a well-configured server refuses (allow-transfer { none; }).

T1590.002

Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DIG · DNS Recon & Encoded Breadcrumbs: In NODE, dig <domain> queries the registrar for a domain's DNS records. dig <domain> TXT is the one that matters -- TXT records hold flavor, and on some domains an encoded string an admin thought nobody would read. dig <domain> ANY dumps everything; dig +short gives just the values (pipe-friendly); dig -x <ip> does reverse. More in the wiki

What defenders see

DNS queries to a public resolver are normal traffic; a single dig is invisible. What defenders watch for is bulk enumeration -- hundreds of subdomain guesses (dictionary/brute DNS), or AXFR zone-transfer attempts, which a well-configured server refuses (allow-transfer { none; }).

T1591

Gather Victim Org Information

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

EMAIL RECON · Open-Source Recon: Write to a target's work address and the mail lands in their real inbox -- open their workstation over RDP (Outlook, Thunderbird, Outlook Express) and it is sitting there, unread. From the MeshMail COMPOSE tab you set the FROM line yourself, so the sender can be anyone: a colleague, a vendor, their own IT. About one send in three reacts. More in the wiki

SOC / THE BLUE TEAM · The Defenders You Dox: Behind the tier-3, tier-5, and tier-6 companies sits a hidden blue team: named SOC and incident-response analysts. They are not on the public roster or FaceLink (a SOC handle renders as a minimal locked profile, never a 404), but their accounts live on the company Domain Controller, so john on the DC's shadow cracks them and their real creds authenticate the corp pivot. The IDENTIFY_SOC mission is the dox payoff: pull the SOC roster from the DC and deliver it to an FTP dead drop. More in the wiki

POSTAL C2 CAMPAIGN · T3+ Missions -- Long-Haul Access: When a target organization can't be reached via internet exploitation (airgapped facilities, hardened external posture, executive-only target with high MFA), the postal route plants hardware physically inside. The insider plugs in a BadUSB or Rubber Duck out of curiosity (or planted gift), the device emulates keyboard/network traffic, deploys a Cobalt beacon, and you have long-haul control from outside. This playbook covers the full chain from target identification to beacon-managed access. More in the wiki

Also used in: THE HOME PIVOT

What defenders see

Defenders watch the shape of inbound mail, not just its content. One sender hitting many mailboxes in a short window is the classic recon signature, and DLP and mail-flow rules alert on it directly.

T1595

Active Scanning

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

DIG · DNS Recon & Encoded Breadcrumbs: In NODE, dig <domain> queries the registrar for a domain's DNS records. dig <domain> TXT is the one that matters -- TXT records hold flavor, and on some domains an encoded string an admin thought nobody would read. dig <domain> ANY dumps everything; dig +short gives just the values (pipe-friendly); dig -x <ip> does reverse. More in the wiki

What defenders see

DNS queries to a public resolver are normal traffic; a single dig is invisible. What defenders watch for is bulk enumeration -- hundreds of subdomain guesses (dictionary/brute DNS), or AXFR zone-transfer attempts, which a well-configured server refuses (allow-transfer { none; }).

T1595.002

Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

NMAP · Network Mapper: In NODE, nmap <ip> hits the target's open ports. Add -sV for service+version detection -- that's the column you'll match against searchsploit. -sS is stealth SYN, lighter touch. More in the wiki

What defenders see

A SOC analyst sees a flood of SYN packets across many ports from one source IP. Standard SIEM rules fire on this within seconds -- 'host:src_ip count:ports > 100 in 10s.' Modern endpoint EDR catches scanning faster than network IDS; the tool detects probing patterns before the noise reaches the network sensors.

T1596

Search Open Technical Databases

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WHOIS · Domain Registration Investigation: whois <domain> queries the registrar for domain ownership info: registrant name, organization, contact email, registration date, expiry, name servers, and address (often partial). host <domain> resolves to IP. Used in OSINT phase before active recon -- you learn who owns a target, when they registered (recent = likely a phishing or fraud setup), and which name servers they use (which themselves can be enumerated for further targets). More in the wiki

ISP OSS/BSS CONSOLE · The Carrier's Operator Panel: The ISP customer-database box doubles as the carrier's OSS/BSS operator console, reachable in the NODE browser. nmap labels its web port as the operator portal, and a sqlmap --dump of its subscriber table points you at it too. Open it on any breach foothold (even sqlmap's database_root), or sign in at the web gate with a weak NOC default or hydra --url. Inside are nine tabs: a Dashboard with live poller graphs, a Subscribers directory searchable by name, account, IP, MAC, phone, address, or employer domain (every row already shows the home IP), a Network view, Provisioning, Billing, Support, DNS/DHCP, an Audit log, and Lawful Intercept. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders use WHOIS in reverse: monitoring for newly-registered domains that mimic their brand (brand monitoring services like RiskIQ, Domain Tools). DMARC/DKIM/SPF prevents email spoofing from look-alike domains.

T1596.002

Search Open Technical Databases: WHOIS

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WHOIS · Domain Registration Investigation: whois <domain> queries the registrar for domain ownership info: registrant name, organization, contact email, registration date, expiry, name servers, and address (often partial). host <domain> resolves to IP. Used in OSINT phase before active recon -- you learn who owns a target, when they registered (recent = likely a phishing or fraud setup), and which name servers they use (which themselves can be enumerated for further targets). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders use WHOIS in reverse: monitoring for newly-registered domains that mimic their brand (brand monitoring services like RiskIQ, Domain Tools). DMARC/DKIM/SPF prevents email spoofing from look-alike domains.

T1596.003

Search Open Technical Databases: Digital Certificates

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WHOIS · Domain Registration Investigation: whois <domain> queries the registrar for domain ownership info: registrant name, organization, contact email, registration date, expiry, name servers, and address (often partial). host <domain> resolves to IP. Used in OSINT phase before active recon -- you learn who owns a target, when they registered (recent = likely a phishing or fraud setup), and which name servers they use (which themselves can be enumerated for further targets). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders use WHOIS in reverse: monitoring for newly-registered domains that mimic their brand (brand monitoring services like RiskIQ, Domain Tools). DMARC/DKIM/SPF prevents email spoofing from look-alike domains.

T1596.004

Search Open Technical Databases: CDNs

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

WHOIS · Domain Registration Investigation: whois <domain> queries the registrar for domain ownership info: registrant name, organization, contact email, registration date, expiry, name servers, and address (often partial). host <domain> resolves to IP. Used in OSINT phase before active recon -- you learn who owns a target, when they registered (recent = likely a phishing or fraud setup), and which name servers they use (which themselves can be enumerated for further targets). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders use WHOIS in reverse: monitoring for newly-registered domains that mimic their brand (brand monitoring services like RiskIQ, Domain Tools). DMARC/DKIM/SPF prevents email spoofing from look-alike domains.

T1598

Phishing for Information

Reconnaissance

MITRE Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

EMAIL RECON · Open-Source Recon: Write to a target's work address and the mail lands in their real inbox -- open their workstation over RDP (Outlook, Thunderbird, Outlook Express) and it is sitting there, unread. From the MeshMail COMPOSE tab you set the FROM line yourself, so the sender can be anyone: a colleague, a vendor, their own IT. About one send in three reacts. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Defenders watch the shape of inbound mail, not just its content. One sender hitting many mailboxes in a short window is the classic recon signature, and DLP and mail-flow rules alert on it directly.

T1599

Network Boundary Bridging

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

CISCO · Switches, Routers and the Gear Between You and the LAN: Two device types run Cisco IOS: MANAGED_SWITCH (Catalyst 2960 / 3750 / 3850 / 9200) and GATEWAY_CISCO (IOS-XE on Catalyst 8200, ISR 4000, ASR 1000). They are reached differently. A managed switch drops you straight into the IOS CLI the moment you connect. More in the wiki

What defenders see

A competently run network makes all of the above much harder. Port security pins a MAC per port and shuts the port on violation.

T1601

Modify System Image

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

CISCO · Switches, Routers and the Gear Between You and the LAN: Two device types run Cisco IOS: MANAGED_SWITCH (Catalyst 2960 / 3750 / 3850 / 9200) and GATEWAY_CISCO (IOS-XE on Catalyst 8200, ISR 4000, ASR 1000). They are reached differently. A managed switch drops you straight into the IOS CLI the moment you connect. More in the wiki

What defenders see

A competently run network makes all of the above much harder. Port security pins a MAC per port and shuts the port on violation.

T1615

Group Policy Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SMBMAP · SMB Share Enumeration: In NODE, smbmap lists the SMB shares on a target and tells you exactly what you can touch. smbmap -H <ip> runs a null session -- you see the share names but mostly NO ACCESS. Feed it credentials you cracked (-u <user> -p <pass>, or it uses creds you already hold for the box) and the READ / READ, WRITE columns light up. More in the wiki

What defenders see

SMB signing, 'restrict anonymous', and removing legacy null-session access shut down unauthenticated enumeration. On the share side, least-privilege NTFS ACLs matter more than the share permission -- smbmap reports the EFFECTIVE access, so an over-broad 'Authenticated Users: Modify' on a finance share is exactly what it finds.

T1657

Financial Theft

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

MAINFRAME · AIX / SWIFT / BASE24 -- Bank Heist Stack: Bank mainframes run AIX 7.3 -- a UNIX variant from IBM that's been in production at banks for decades. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. The stack is three layers deep: AIX shell at the OS layer, SWIFT Alliance Access 7.3 as a subshell for international wire transfers, BASE24-eps as another subshell for ATM/POS switching. More in the wiki

BLOCKCHAIN · Chain Forensics / Blockstream Explorer: Blockstream explorer (node://blockstream.onion) is the tool for CHAIN_TRACE missions. EconomyEngine maintains a blockchain ledger (max 2000 transactions) and blocks (max 500), generated procedurally per block height with deterministic seeds. Address tags categorize: SHELL (corporate front), SUSPECT (likely-criminal), CORPORATE (legitimate), CHAIN (intermediate hop). More in the wiki

BANK MAINFRAME HEIST · T5-T6 Capstone -- The Endgame: The capstone playbook -- demonstrates SIGINT, AIX, SWIFT, BASE24, and economy systems working together. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. Multi-stage: SIGINT for MFA intercept, AIX for OS access, mirror-break for SWIFT writability, SWIFT for transfer redirect, BASE24 for ATM cashout. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Real banks run airgapped SWIFT terminals with hardware tokens, dual-control on every transaction, and hot-tape backups every 15 minutes. Modern AIX deploys use IBM PowerVM partitioning to isolate SWIFT VMs from production.

T1685

Disable or Modify Tools

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SECURITY AGENTS · Endpoint Telemetry and How to Kill It: Any box on a LAN that runs a log collector -- a SIEM, IPS, or IDS appliance -- ships telemetry to it through one security agent, matched to the stack: a Splunk universal forwarder (splunkd, :9997) to a SIEM, a Cisco Secure Endpoint connector (ampdaemon, :443) to a Firepower IPS, or filebeat (:5044) to a Suricata/Elastic IDS. The LAN's Linux servers (web, db, dc, ftp, legacy) run whichever matches; the gateways and the FreeBSD logging/mail boxes forward with syslog-ng (:514) instead, since neither can run a Splunk or Cisco connector. The gateway matters most -- the perimeter feeding the internal SIEM. More in the wiki

pfSENSE FIREWALLS · The FreeBSD firewall with a numbered console: In NODE, a pfSense box is a GATEWAY_FIREWALL whose service is pfSense (the other firewalls are FortiOS). nmap -sV shows pfSense WebGUI on 443/8443 and a FreeBSD OS guess. Three real pfSense CVEs are in the exploitdb: CVE-2021-41282 (root), CVE-2023-42326 (user), and CVE-2022-31814 (pfBlockerNG). More in the wiki

BANK MAINFRAME HEIST · T5-T6 Capstone -- The Endgame: The capstone playbook -- demonstrates SIGINT, AIX, SWIFT, BASE24, and economy systems working together. SWIFT_REDIRECT contracts unlock at trust 20, ATM_CASHOUT at trust 25. Multi-stage: SIGINT for MFA intercept, AIX for OS access, mirror-break for SWIFT writability, SWIFT for transfer redirect, BASE24 for ATM cashout. More in the wiki

What defenders see

The silence is the signal. SOC tooling alerts on forwarder heartbeat loss within minutes -- a managed agent that stops checking in is treated as compromise until proven otherwise.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1562.001 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1562 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1562.001 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1562.001 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685 (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1685.005

Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

LOGS · The Trail You Leave Behind: Every server you touch records you twice. Network logs (the trail TraceManager walks back through your proxy chain) and filesystem logs (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog on the box itself). logcleaner --all handles both layers when you have root (truncates everything, triggers dual-track penalty). More in the wiki

What defenders see

SOC analysts notice missing log entries faster than altered ones. Verizon's DBIR shows median time-to-detect at 207 days but median time-to-contain post-detection at 73 days -- the gap is where attackers operate.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1070.001 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685.005 (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1685.006

Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SECURITY AGENTS · Endpoint Telemetry and How to Kill It: Any box on a LAN that runs a log collector -- a SIEM, IPS, or IDS appliance -- ships telemetry to it through one security agent, matched to the stack: a Splunk universal forwarder (splunkd, :9997) to a SIEM, a Cisco Secure Endpoint connector (ampdaemon, :443) to a Firepower IPS, or filebeat (:5044) to a Suricata/Elastic IDS. The LAN's Linux servers (web, db, dc, ftp, legacy) run whichever matches; the gateways and the FreeBSD logging/mail boxes forward with syslog-ng (:514) instead, since neither can run a Splunk or Cisco connector. The gateway matters most -- the perimeter feeding the internal SIEM. More in the wiki

LOGS · The Trail You Leave Behind: Every server you touch records you twice. Network logs (the trail TraceManager walks back through your proxy chain) and filesystem logs (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog on the box itself). logcleaner --all handles both layers when you have root (truncates everything, triggers dual-track penalty). More in the wiki

WEB SERVER TAKEOVER · T1-T2 Missions -- Bread and Butter: The bread-and-butter NODE op. A bank, corporate, or other organization is running an old web service on a target you've been contracted to breach. Most early missions (STEAL_DATA, DELETE_DATA, MODIFY_RECORDS) are this shape. More in the wiki

What defenders see

The silence is the signal. SOC tooling alerts on forwarder heartbeat loss within minutes -- a managed agent that stops checking in is treated as compromise until proven otherwise.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1070.002 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685.006 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1070.002 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685.006 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1070.002 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1685.006 (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1686

Disable or Modify System Firewall

Defense Impairment

MITRE Adversaries may disable or modify host-based or network firewalls to impair defensive mechanisms and enable further action. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

CISCO · Switches, Routers and the Gear Between You and the LAN: Two device types run Cisco IOS: MANAGED_SWITCH (Catalyst 2960 / 3750 / 3850 / 9200) and GATEWAY_CISCO (IOS-XE on Catalyst 8200, ISR 4000, ASR 1000). They are reached differently. A managed switch drops you straight into the IOS CLI the moment you connect. More in the wiki

What defenders see

A competently run network makes all of the above much harder. Port security pins a MAC per port and shuts the port on violation.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1562.004 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1686 (ATT&CK v20.1).

Mobile matrix · 8 techniques

T1398

Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

Persistence

MITRE Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PEGASUS · iOS Zero-Click Exploit Chain: Pegasus is the iPhone exploit. Buy the toolkit from the darkmarket PEGASUS tab (expensive), then pegasus <imsi> runs a five-stage zero-click chain: iMessage parser exploit -> kernel exploit -> persistence -> sandbox escape -> root. GPU-intensive (heat warning). More in the wiki

What defenders see

Apple's response to Pegasus is multi-layered: BlastDoor sandbox for iMessage processing, Lockdown Mode (turns off attack surface for high-risk users at the cost of features), rapid security response patches, and iOS 16+ device-bound credentials that survive even root compromise of one device. Forensic detection: MVT compares device state against known IOCs; iCloud backup analysis catches persistence artifacts; SIDS (Shadow Indicator Detection Service) by Citizen Lab.

T1404

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Privilege Escalation

MITRE Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in order to elevate privileges. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SIGINT · Signal Decoupler / Cellular Interception: Signal Decoupler unlocks at trust 12 and opens a whole new attack surface: cellular spectrum. The waterfall shows live phone signals across the spectrum; tune in to a signal, lock its IMSI, watch its data stream. Five Signal Integrity (SI) thresholds: 0.3 metadata, 0.5 phone exploit ready, 0.8 stream intercept, 1.0 ghost mode. More in the wiki

PEGASUS · iOS Zero-Click Exploit Chain: Pegasus is the iPhone exploit. Buy the toolkit from the darkmarket PEGASUS tab (expensive), then pegasus <imsi> runs a five-stage zero-click chain: iMessage parser exploit -> kernel exploit -> persistence -> sandbox escape -> root. GPU-intensive (heat warning). More in the wiki

WPA2 PIVOT HEIST · T2-T3 Missions -- Outside to Inside: When the wired network is too hardened for direct attack, the access point is the backdoor. This playbook covers reaching mobile devices (phones, tablets) that aren't visible from the public internet but ARE associated to a wireless AP on a LAN you've already breached. The AP itself is the gateway you crack; the phones connected to it are revealed only after the crack succeeds. More in the wiki

Also used in: MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE

What defenders see

Cellular providers run anomaly detection on IMSI catchers (sudden cluster of phones registering with one tower, signal-strength patterns inconsistent with terrain). Modern handsets warn users about LTE-to-2G downgrade attacks.

T1409

Stored Application Data

Collection

MITRE Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

ADB · Android Debug Bridge Exploitation: adb_exploit <ip> targets Android devices that have ADB exposed. Grants root shell access without a screen unlock. Use --bypass-fmd to defeat Find My Device on stolen-handset workflows. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Android security has matured rapidly. ADB-over-WiFi is now off by default, requires per-pairing approval, and Google Play Protect actively scans for ADB-related malware on Android devices.

T1418

Software Discovery

Discovery

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of applications that are installed on a device. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PEGASUS · iOS Zero-Click Exploit Chain: Pegasus is the iPhone exploit. Buy the toolkit from the darkmarket PEGASUS tab (expensive), then pegasus <imsi> runs a five-stage zero-click chain: iMessage parser exploit -> kernel exploit -> persistence -> sandbox escape -> root. GPU-intensive (heat warning). More in the wiki

MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE · T3-T4 Missions -- The Phone Is The Target: When a mission requires phone-resident data (SMS, contacts, photos, MFA codes, app data) or when the phone IS the pivot (intercept MFA to attack a downstream system like the bank mainframe), this is the playbook. SIGINT lock + phone exploit + extraction. Trust 12+ unlocks SIGINT; phone exploits gate at SI thresholds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Apple's response to Pegasus is multi-layered: BlastDoor sandbox for iMessage processing, Lockdown Mode (turns off attack surface for high-risk users at the cost of features), rapid security response patches, and iOS 16+ device-bound credentials that survive even root compromise of one device. Forensic detection: MVT compares device state against known IOCs; iCloud backup analysis catches persistence artifacts; SIDS (Shadow Indicator Detection Service) by Citizen Lab.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1402 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1418 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1402 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1418 (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1430

Location Tracking

CollectionDiscovery

MITRE Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SIGINT · Signal Decoupler / Cellular Interception: Signal Decoupler unlocks at trust 12 and opens a whole new attack surface: cellular spectrum. The waterfall shows live phone signals across the spectrum; tune in to a signal, lock its IMSI, watch its data stream. Five Signal Integrity (SI) thresholds: 0.3 metadata, 0.5 phone exploit ready, 0.8 stream intercept, 1.0 ghost mode. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cellular providers run anomaly detection on IMSI catchers (sudden cluster of phones registering with one tower, signal-strength patterns inconsistent with terrain). Modern handsets warn users about LTE-to-2G downgrade attacks.

T1437

Application Layer Protocol

Command and Control

MITRE Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

SIGINT · Signal Decoupler / Cellular Interception: Signal Decoupler unlocks at trust 12 and opens a whole new attack surface: cellular spectrum. The waterfall shows live phone signals across the spectrum; tune in to a signal, lock its IMSI, watch its data stream. Five Signal Integrity (SI) thresholds: 0.3 metadata, 0.5 phone exploit ready, 0.8 stream intercept, 1.0 ghost mode. More in the wiki

ADB · Android Debug Bridge Exploitation: adb_exploit <ip> targets Android devices that have ADB exposed. Grants root shell access without a screen unlock. Use --bypass-fmd to defeat Find My Device on stolen-handset workflows. More in the wiki

MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE · T3-T4 Missions -- The Phone Is The Target: When a mission requires phone-resident data (SMS, contacts, photos, MFA codes, app data) or when the phone IS the pivot (intercept MFA to attack a downstream system like the bank mainframe), this is the playbook. SIGINT lock + phone exploit + extraction. Trust 12+ unlocks SIGINT; phone exploits gate at SI thresholds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Cellular providers run anomaly detection on IMSI catchers (sudden cluster of phones registering with one tower, signal-strength patterns inconsistent with terrain). Modern handsets warn users about LTE-to-2G downgrade attacks.

T1636.003

Protected User Data: Contact List

Collection

MITRE Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PEGASUS · iOS Zero-Click Exploit Chain: Pegasus is the iPhone exploit. Buy the toolkit from the darkmarket PEGASUS tab (expensive), then pegasus <imsi> runs a five-stage zero-click chain: iMessage parser exploit -> kernel exploit -> persistence -> sandbox escape -> root. GPU-intensive (heat warning). More in the wiki

ADB · Android Debug Bridge Exploitation: adb_exploit <ip> targets Android devices that have ADB exposed. Grants root shell access without a screen unlock. Use --bypass-fmd to defeat Find My Device on stolen-handset workflows. More in the wiki

WPA2 PIVOT HEIST · T2-T3 Missions -- Outside to Inside: When the wired network is too hardened for direct attack, the access point is the backdoor. This playbook covers reaching mobile devices (phones, tablets) that aren't visible from the public internet but ARE associated to a wireless AP on a LAN you've already breached. The AP itself is the gateway you crack; the phones connected to it are revealed only after the crack succeeds. More in the wiki

Also used in: MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE

What defenders see

Apple's response to Pegasus is multi-layered: BlastDoor sandbox for iMessage processing, Lockdown Mode (turns off attack surface for high-risk users at the cost of features), rapid security response patches, and iOS 16+ device-bound credentials that survive even root compromise of one device. Forensic detection: MVT compares device state against known IOCs; iCloud backup analysis catches persistence artifacts; SIDS (Shadow Indicator Detection Service) by Citizen Lab.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1432 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1636.003 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1432 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1636.003 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1432 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1636.003 (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1432 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T1636.003 (ATT&CK v20.1).

T1664

Exploitation for Initial Access

Initial Access

MITRE Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a mobile device. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

PEGASUS · iOS Zero-Click Exploit Chain: Pegasus is the iPhone exploit. Buy the toolkit from the darkmarket PEGASUS tab (expensive), then pegasus <imsi> runs a five-stage zero-click chain: iMessage parser exploit -> kernel exploit -> persistence -> sandbox escape -> root. GPU-intensive (heat warning). More in the wiki

MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE · T3-T4 Missions -- The Phone Is The Target: When a mission requires phone-resident data (SMS, contacts, photos, MFA codes, app data) or when the phone IS the pivot (intercept MFA to attack a downstream system like the bank mainframe), this is the playbook. SIGINT lock + phone exploit + extraction. Trust 12+ unlocks SIGINT; phone exploits gate at SI thresholds. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Apple's response to Pegasus is multi-layered: BlastDoor sandbox for iMessage processing, Lockdown Mode (turns off attack surface for high-risk users at the cost of features), rapid security response patches, and iOS 16+ device-bound credentials that survive even root compromise of one device. Forensic detection: MVT compares device state against known IOCs; iCloud backup analysis catches persistence artifacts; SIDS (Shadow Indicator Detection Service) by Citizen Lab.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1474 here; T1664 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

The in-game Field Handbook lists T1474 here; T1664 matches what the game does (ATT&CK v20.1).

ICS matrix · 3 techniques

T0816

Device Restart/Shutdown

Inhibit Response Function

MITRE Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

IOT · CCTV / Printer / PLC Manipulation: IoT in NODE means three categories of weak embedded devices: CCTV (running busybox, default creds, cctv_view/cctv_disable/cctv_loop to hijack), printers (printjack dumps the print spool for credential leaks), and industrial PLCs (overload sabotages SCADA registers). Each lives behind gateway switches and shows up via netdiscover after you've reached the LAN. Most have firmware unchanged for years -- DirtyCow-era kernels, default admin passwords, no segmentation from the corporate network. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern IoT defense centers on network segmentation: cameras and PLCs go on isolated VLANs that can't reach corporate networks. NAC (Network Access Control) enforces device profiles.

T0832

Manipulation of View

Impact

MITRE Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

IOT · CCTV / Printer / PLC Manipulation: IoT in NODE means three categories of weak embedded devices: CCTV (running busybox, default creds, cctv_view/cctv_disable/cctv_loop to hijack), printers (printjack dumps the print spool for credential leaks), and industrial PLCs (overload sabotages SCADA registers). Each lives behind gateway switches and shows up via netdiscover after you've reached the LAN. Most have firmware unchanged for years -- DirtyCow-era kernels, default admin passwords, no segmentation from the corporate network. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern IoT defense centers on network segmentation: cameras and PLCs go on isolated VLANs that can't reach corporate networks. NAC (Network Access Control) enforces device profiles.

T0836

Modify Parameter

Impair Process Control

MITRE Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. Read on attack.mitre.org

In NODE

IOT · CCTV / Printer / PLC Manipulation: IoT in NODE means three categories of weak embedded devices: CCTV (running busybox, default creds, cctv_view/cctv_disable/cctv_loop to hijack), printers (printjack dumps the print spool for credential leaks), and industrial PLCs (overload sabotages SCADA registers). Each lives behind gateway switches and shows up via netdiscover after you've reached the LAN. Most have firmware unchanged for years -- DirtyCow-era kernels, default admin passwords, no segmentation from the corporate network. More in the wiki

What defenders see

Modern IoT defense centers on network segmentation: cameras and PLCs go on isolated VLANs that can't reach corporate networks. NAC (Network Access Control) enforces device profiles.

The in-game Field Handbook lists T0833 here; MITRE retired that ID, so this wiki uses T0836 (ATT&CK v20.1).

Where this wiki differs from the Field Handbook

Section titled “Where this wiki differs from the Field Handbook”

The in-game Field Handbook maps each tool to ATT&CK. This wiki checks every ID against MITRE’s current data. Where MITRE has retired an ID, where another technique matches the game more closely, or where a step had no mapping yet, the wiki uses the corrected ID:

Field HandbookThis wikiWhyTopics
T1557.003T1557.004 Adversary-in-the-Middle: Evil TwinCloser matchEVIL_TWIN, WIFI, WPA2 PIVOT HEIST
–T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelAdded (missing in the handbook)COBALT, WEB SERVER TAKEOVER
T1078.004removedCloser matchMAINFRAME
T1474T1664 Exploitation for Initial AccessCloser matchPEGASUS, MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE
T1402T1418 Software DiscoveryRetired by MITREPEGASUS, MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE
T1432T1636.003 Protected User Data: Contact ListRetired by MITREPEGASUS, ADB, WPA2 PIVOT HEIST, MOBILE PHONE COMPROMISE
T0833T0836 Modify ParameterRetired by MITREIOT
T1070.002T1685.006 Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System LogsRetired by MITRELOGS, SECURITY AGENTS, WEB SERVER TAKEOVER
T1070.001T1685.005 Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event LogsRetired by MITRELOGS
T1562.001T1685 Disable or Modify ToolsRetired by MITRESECURITY AGENTS, pfSENSE FIREWALLS, BANK MAINFRAME HEIST
T1562T1685 Disable or Modify ToolsRetired by MITRESECURITY AGENTS
T1550T1552.004 Unsecured Credentials: Private KeysCloser matchSSH
T1110.004T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default AccountsCloser matchSNMPWALK
T1562.004T1686 Disable or Modify System FirewallRetired by MITRECISCO
–T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolAdded (missing in the handbook)SOC / THE BLUE TEAM
T1561.002T1565.001 Data Manipulation: Stored Data ManipulationCloser matchBANK MAINFRAME HEIST
MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Tactic and technique names and definitions are from ATT&CK v20.1, © The MITRE Corporation, used under the ATT&CK Terms of Use.