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Legacy OS Servers

Not every target runs a current OS. Scattered across mid-to-high networks are machines that should have been retired a decade ago and never were: a Solaris box in a bank’s back office, an OpenVMS cluster behind a power utility, an AS/400 holding the system of record. They are still here because something important still runs on them, and because nobody dared switch them off. Each is its own world, with its own shell, its own way in, and its own loot.

The catch is that many are not even on the network. nmap cannot see them because they have no IP stack of their own, only a serial console wired to a Lantronix terminal server on the management VLAN. So there are two routes onto a legacy box: the network route (if it is reachable, an old RPC or RDP service is usually the door) or the serial route, through the terminal server.

System Hardware / era Way in Shell Ceiling
Lantronix ETS-16 serial console concentrator telnet, no password Local> appliance CLI gateway only (serial ports)
SunOS / Solaris 8 Sun SPARC RPC exploit, or ETS serial SVR4 Unix root
SGI IRIX 6.5 MIPS workstation RPC exploit, no-password accounts, or ETS/PROM IRIX Unix user, then root via ToolTalk
OpenVMS VAX / Alpha default accounts or reused creds DCL ($) USER (no escalation)
Novell NetWare 6.5 file/print server metasploit, hydra, or ETS boot : console + NLMs admin
Microsemi SyncServer S650 NTP time appliance command injection (CVE-2022-40022) SyncServer> root
FreePBX (Asterisk) the company phone system reused credentials or hydra Linux shell + admin panel user
Windows NT 4.0 the OS that introduced RDP reused credentials cmd.exe (1996 DOS) Administrator
Windows 2000 Server IIS / SQL / Backup roles MS08-067, MS03-026, or role exploit cmd.exe SYSTEM
IBM AS/400 OS/400 green-screen 5250 default operator profile CL (===>) QSECOFR (*ALLOBJ)

The boxy little appliance on the management VLAN is a terminal server: a serial console concentrator. No screen, no keyboard, just sixteen serial ports and an open telnet door. When a server room was a rack of machines with RS232 console ports, one of these sat in the corner so an admin could reach any of them over the network. They were everywhere, and most were left wide open.

Scan the LAN and find the box (nmap tags it a Lantronix terminal server on port 23), then:

telnet <ip>

There is no password. It prints its banner and drops you at the Local> prompt. That is the real appliance CLI, not a Unix shell, and it grants no shell by itself. The ETS has no exploits. Its value is the gear wired to its serial ports.

Local> command What it does
help or ? List the commands
show server Name, IP, MAC, firmware, uptime
show port The 16 serial ports and their state
connect port <n> Attach to the device on serial line n
set privileged Enter config mode (Local>>); default login admin / admin
define Set a parameter (privileged only)
boot Restart the server (privileged only)
logout Drop the telnet session

The CLI accepts unambiguous abbreviations: sh server, conn port 2, lo.

Sun’s workhorse Unix on SPARC hardware. uname calls it SunOS 5.8; the world knew it as Solaris 8 (2000). SVR4, not BSD and not Linux: its own packaging (pkginfo), its own hardware tools (prtconf, prtdiag, psrinfo) and the classic /usr/bin vs /usr/ucb split. You still find these running in the corners of banks, universities and government. Nobody dared turn them off.

Two ways in:

  • On the network (VLAN discovery): a scan finds it and nmap reads SunOS 5.8 with the old RPC services open. The breach is those RPC daemons. They run as root, so a hit lands you straight at root: metasploit sadmind (CVE-2003-0722) or rpc.ttdbserverd (CVE-2001-0717).
  • Behind a Lantronix ETS (invisible to nmap): some of these boxes are not on the network at all, only their serial console is. telnet the ETS, then connect port 2 and you drop onto the operator console, already logged in as root.
Solaris command Output
uname -a SunOS 5.8 Generic sun4u sparc
showrev -p Release and patch list
prtconf Hardware and memory
pkginfo Installed SUNW packages
psrinfo -v The UltraSPARC CPU
ps -ef SVR4 process list
/usr/ucb/ps aux The BSD ps (the famous Solaris duality)

Loot: /etc/shadow lists the organisation’s own staff; crack it with john and those passwords reuse to the entity’s other machines. The old archives live under /export/home and /var. Pull them before the box is finally switched off.

Silicon Graphics’ Unix, on MIPS hardware: the machines that rendered films and ran research and defense labs. SVR4 under a graphics-workstation skin, with its own hardware inventory (hinv), its own software catalog (versions) and home directories under /usr/people. The prompt carries a history number: host 1#.

Two ways in:

  • On the network, nmap reads IRIX 6.5 with the old RPC services. Two footholds: metasploit rpc.ttdbserverd (CVE-2001-0717) to root, or ssh guest@host. The infamous IRIX default accounts ship with no password (guest, lp, 4Dgifts, EZsetup, demos) and give a user shell. finger reveals them; root is still via ToolTalk.

  • Behind a Lantronix ETS these boxes are dead: a flat NVRAM battery dropped them to the PROM. connect port <n> lands you in the SGI System Maintenance Menu, not a shell. Recover the boot:

    Option? 5 (Enter Command Monitor)
    >> hinv (find the disk: dksc(0,1,0))
    >> setenv OSLoadPartition dksc(0,1,0)
    >> boot

    and IRIX boots for real, dropping you at the root shell.

IRIX command Output
hinv Hardware inventory
uname -aR IRIX release and machine (IP class)
versions Installed software
gfxinfo Graphics hardware
chkconfig Service flags
ps -ef Process list

Loot: /etc/shadow for passwords that reuse to the entity’s other machines; the archives live under /usr/people.

DEC’s legendary minicomputer OS, still holding together the back offices of banks, power utilities and government. Two sub-models share one skin: an older VAX V7.3 box or a newer Alpha V8.4 box, and nmap’s OS line tells you which. This is not Unix: the shell is DCL, the prompt is a bare $, files look like DISK:[DIRECTORY]FILE.TYP;version, and you move around with SET DEFAULT.

OpenVMS is not broken with a memory-corruption exploit. searchsploit and metasploit have nothing for it. The real VMS break-in is through its accounts, the way the old NASA and SPAN intrusions did it. nmap shows 22/ssh, 23/telnet and 79/finger. Log in over SSH with a default account, or reuse a staff password cracked on another of the entity’s machines:

ssh SYSTEST_CLIG@<ip> (VAX, blank password)
ssh GUEST@<ip> (blank password)

Either way you land at the $ DCL prompt.

DCL command What it does
SHOW SYSTEM The process table
SHOW USERS Who is logged in
SHOW DEFAULT Your current directory
SET DEFAULT dev:[dir] Change directory
DIRECTORY (DIR) List files (/SIZE /DATE /FULL for detail)
TYPE file.ext Display a file
HELP The interactive DCL help library (Topic? / Subtopic?)
LOGOUT End the session

Your own operator tools (download, logcleaner, analyze, …) work at the $ prompt. SET DEFAULT into a directory first, then download by file name.

Loot: the readable prize is under DISK$USERS: staff home directories with mail, command procedures and old project archives (SET DEFAULT DISK$USERS:[<user>], then DIR). SYS$MANAGER holds the site startup procedures and the operator notes.

The file-and-print server that ran the 1990s and 2000s office. NetWare is neither Unix nor Windows. You drive it from the bare : System Console (the server name followed by a colon), load .NLM modules, and its users and rights live in an NDS/eDirectory tree. Files sit on volumes such as SYS: (SYS:SYSTEM, SYS:PUBLIC). nmap reads Novell NetWare 6.5 with 524/ncp, 427/slp, 111/rpcbind, 2034/rconsolej and 21/ftp.

Three ways in, all landing you at the : console with full admin:

  • metasploit: the SunRPC portmapper on :111 runs PKERNEL.NLM in kernel mode; exploit/netware/sunrpc/pkernel_callit overflows it into remote code execution (a failed shot reboots the box). Then shell / connect to the console.
  • hydra: brute the RConsoleJ remote-console agent on :2034. That password also sits in cleartext in SYS:SYSTEM\AUTOEXEC.NCF (LOAD RCONAG6 ...), so looting one box walks you into the next.
  • Behind the terminal server (powered down): some NetWare boxes are reachable only through the ETS, and they sit at the DOS prompt C:\NWSERVER>. Connect the serial port and type the real command to boot NetWare: SERVER. It loads LOADER, processes STARTUP.NCF, mounts SYS:, runs AUTOEXEC.NCF and drops you at the : console.
: console command What it does
CONFIG Server name, network, NDS tree, bindery context
MODULES Loaded NLMs (MODULES D* matches by prefix)
VOLUMES Mounted volumes and name spaces
NLIST USER NDS user objects (eDirectory)
MONITOR Utilization, memory, connections
DISPLAY SERVERS Known NetWare servers

Standard file commands (cat, ls, tree, download) and your own operator tools work on the SYS: volume. HELP lists the console commands; DOWN / RESTART SERVER confirm first.

Loot: SYS:SYSTEM holds AUTOEXEC.NCF (the RConsoleJ password), STARTUP.NCF and the NLMs; SYS:SYSTEM\BACKUP has an NDS export and a TSA volume saveset; SYS:_NETWARE is the eDirectory database itself. Pull them before the old box is retired.

An enterprise NTP time server: a GNSS-disciplined stratum-1 clock that keeps every host on the network in sync. It runs embedded Linux behind a web UI and a CLI; nmap reads Microsemi SyncServer with 123/ntp, 443/https and 22/ssh. There is one on essentially every mid-to-high network.

Getting in: the web interface on :443 has an unauthenticated command injection in /controller/ping.php (CVE-2022-40022); exploit/linux/http/symmetricom_syncserver_rce gives remote code execution as root. Then shell / connect to the SyncServer> console.

SyncServer> command What it does
show system Model, software, uptime, timing reference
show gnss status GNSS/GPS lock and satellites
show ntp NTP peers and every host synchronizing to this server

show ntp is also your host map: it lists every client on the LAN. Standard file tools (cat, ls, tree, download) work on the appliance; serial boxes behind the ETS land at SyncServer> directly.

The company phone system: FreePBX 16 on Asterisk 18, running on Sangoma Linux 7. Every desk phone registers to it, every call passes through it, and it keeps a record of each one. There is one on every tier 2 and higher network, on the Servers VLAN. nmap reads FreePBX on 5060/udp and 5160/udp (SIP), with 4569/udp (IAX2), 5038 (the Asterisk manager), 80/443 (the admin panel) and 22 (ssh).

There is no public exploit for it: searchsploit finds nothing and metasploit has no module. The way in is the people. Staff reuse their passwords across the company’s machines, so a password cracked on another box opens this one too:

Terminal window
john /etc/shadow # on any box of the same company
ssh <user>@<pbx> # with the cracked password

Or brute-force a login with hydra. Either way you land as a user, not root.

Browse to the box’s address for the FreePBX Administration login. Behind it:

Page What it shows
Dashboard Calls in progress, phones online, services
Reports > CDR Reports Every call: who rang whom, when, how long
Applications > Extensions Each person’s extension and direct number
Applications > Ring Groups The help desk line and who answers it

CDR Reports filters by date and extension; CSV File saves the search to /home/downloads. Pulling records is noticed: each export costs heat.

Calls run in office hours, in the company’s own time zone; nights and weekends are quiet. The outside numbers a company calls most often belong to its partners. Search a number on FaceLink to find whose it is: a full number names the person and puts their employer’s gateway on your map.

The extensions match the intranet phone list and the help desk number on the intranet help page. On the box itself, ss and netstat also show the services it keeps to itself: the database and the mail relay.

The Windows that ran the late-90s back office, and the OS that introduced RDP: Terminal Server Edition, build 1381, SP6a. You can log in with a password you already hold, no exploit required.

nmap reads Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 with 139/netbios-ssn, 135/msrpc and 3389/ms-wbt-server (RDP 4.0, and never 445: that is a Windows 2000 thing). The NT4 SAM shares the domain’s user pool, so a password cracked with john on an easier box in the same entity opens this one:

  • Remote Desktop Connection (the GUI app): enter the IP, then the credentials.
  • connect <ip>: the cmd.exe shell on the same box (terminal).

An Administrator credential gives full control; any other account is a plain user session.

This is 1996 DOS, not Unix and not modern Windows: no PowerShell, no tasklist, no systeminfo.

cmd.exe command What it does
dir / type List / read a file
tree The native DOS tree
net user / net share Accounts and shares
ipconfig /all Adapters
ver Windows NT Version 4.0

The Unix write tools (nano, rm, cp, mv) are not here: use the DOS native del / copy / move / edit.

Loot: the SAM is in C:\WINNT\system32\config, and the classic backup copy sits in C:\WINNT\repair\sam._: pull it and crack it offline. Staff profiles are under C:\WINNT\Profiles.

The system of record is RecordSys, a forms app under C:\Program Files\RecordSys. Open it from Start > Programs > RecordSys. Type an ID or a name in the search box, click a row to load the detail form, change the editable field (or use Purge to drop the record), then Save. Save commits to RECORDS.DAT. Every Save also appends to the RecordSys audit at C:\Program Files\RecordSys\LOG\AUDIT.LOG, so for a clean job clear that line and your Security log logon before you disconnect.

The common legacy Windows box, one on nearly every tier 3-6 network, build 5.00.2195. Where NT4 was a single machine, this one wears a role, and the role sets the apps, the loot and the signature exploit.

nmap reads Microsoft Windows 2000 Server with 135/msrpc, 137-139/netbios, 445/microsoft-ds (the 2000-ism NT4 never had) and 3389/ms-wbt-server (RDP 5.0). Three ways in, all to SYSTEM:

  • metasploit: MS08-067 (ms08_067_netapi, 445) or MS03-026 (ms03_026_dcom, 135).
  • Remote Desktop: a password cracked with john on an easier box in the same entity (the SAM shares the domain pool).
  • Role exploit: the box’s own flaw (below).

Then connect <ip> for the cmd.exe shell, or Remote Desktop Connection for the GUI.

Role Build Signature exploit Loot
IIS (WEB01) IIS 5.0 on :80, SP3 MS03-007 WebDAV (ms03_007, CVE-2003-0109) to SYSTEM C:\InetPub\wwwroot\include\db_conn.inc (connection string)
SQL (SQL01) SQL Server 2000 SP2 (8.00.534), :1433 + udp:1434 MS02-039 Slammer (ms02_039, CVE-2002-0649) to SYSTEM data via Enterprise Manager / Query Analyzer, or sqlmap with the sa password
Backup (BACKUP01) NTBackup (reused creds / RDP) .bkf sets under C:\Backup; a restore gives credential pivots

SP4 patched both the IIS and SQL flaws, so those boxes deliberately run SP3 / SP2.

The shell is DOS, not Unix: dir / type, tree, net user / net share, ipconfig /all, netsh / sc / tlist; ver reads 5.00.2195. Use the DOS del / copy / move / edit, not nano / rm / cp.

Loot: the SAM and its C:\WINNT\repair backup crack offline; the role loot is the .mdf / db_conn.inc on SQL and IIS and the .bkf sets on Backup.

IBM midrange (the iSeries / AS/400e), OS/400 on PowerPC AS. The classic green-screen 5250 terminal: fixed 24x80 panels and a Command Entry line, ===>, that takes CL commands. nmap reads it as IBM OS/400 with TN5250 telnet on 23 (992 for TLS), DDM/DRDA on 446/448, the server mapper on 449 and sign-on verification on 8476. A handful sit on mid-to-high networks; some are cabled behind a Lantronix ETS. Reach it over telnet (the native TN5250 path) or ssh: both land at the OS/400 Command Entry.

CL command What it does
DSPLIBL The job’s library list
DSPLIB LIB(name) Objects in a library
WRKACTJOB Active jobs
WRKSYSSTS CPU, storage and job counts
DSPSYSVAL SYSVAL(name) A system value (try QSECURITY)
DSPUSRPRF / WRKUSRPRF User profiles and authority
DSPAUDJRNE The QAUDJRN security audit journal
CRTSAVF / SAVLIB Create a save file / save a library into one
FTP RMTSYS(host) The box’s own outbound FTP client
CALL PGM(lib/name) Call a program
GO MAIN / SIGNOFF The main menu / end the session

The standard operator tools (ls, cd, cat, tree, download, john, logcleaner) work over the Integrated File System, where library objects live under /QSYS.LIB.

Loot: the sector core library is the institution’s system of record: finance keeps the account master and the transaction journal, insurance the policy master and claims, industry the item and order files, government the person and benefits records. Everything the box does is written to the QHST history log and the QAUDJRN audit journal.

  • Network & Devices: modern Windows (7 / 10), switches, NetScaler and pfSense, and how to spot a legacy box on a LAN.
  • AIX Mainframes: the other non-Linux heavyweight, with SWIFT and the BASE24 ATM switch.
  • Scanning & Stealth: the nmap reads that fingerprint these systems (and the ones that cannot be scanned at all).
  • Lateral Movement: credential reuse across an entity’s boxes, and reaching the VLAN the terminal server sits on.
  • Staying Anonymous: where the SyncServer clock-step fits in your trace management.