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AIX Mainframes

Banking domains do not run Linux. They run IBM AIX 7.3 on Power Systems hardware, and when you connect to one you land in a ksh (Korn Shell) environment, not bash. These are high-security financial infrastructure targets with their own tooling, a SWIFT payment terminal and an ATM switch controller. They are the deep end of the game.

Mainframes (BANK_MAINFRAME) appear on 13 specific banking domains (for example treasury.ledger.gov, offshore.bank.is, vertex.finance.com). Look for:

Signal Value
Hostname prefix mf-01.*
Service AIX-PowerHA (port 4889)
VLAN SECRET
OS fingerprint IBM AIX 7.3 TL2 (Power Systems)
Architecture ppc64

Two CVEs target the AIX-PowerHA service:

CVE What it is
CVE-2024-22329 HTTP Request Smuggling
CVE-2023-45168 nimvrmgr Command Injection

Use searchsploit AIX or searchsploit PowerHA to find them, then exploit with metasploit as usual.

These commands only work on AIX mainframes:

Command What it does
lsdev -Cc disk/adapter/processor List hardware devices by class
lspv List physical volumes (hdisk0, hdisk1, …)
lsvg [-l vgname] List volume groups, or LVs within a VG
odmget -q "name=hdisk0" CuAt Query ODM device attributes
errpt [-a] System error report (summary or detailed)
lsattr -El <device> Device attributes (sys0, hdisk0, etc.)
topas Performance monitor (CPU, memory, disk, network)
oslevel -s Show AIX version (e.g. 7300-02-01-2425)
svmon -G Global memory statistics
bootlist -m normal Boot device order
lslpp -l [pattern] List installed packages/filesets
instfix -i List applied security fixes (APARs)
vmo -a VM tunables
lssrc -a List subsystem status (AIX service manager)
cfgmgr Configuration manager

Common Linux commands are not available. Typing one shows a hint with the AIX equivalent:

Linux AIX equivalent
systemctl lssrc -a
apt / yum installp / smit install
ip addr ifconfig -a
lspci lsdev -Cc adapter
journalctl errpt
free svmon -G
top topas
lsblk lspv / lsvg

Hacking toolkit commands (nmap, metasploit, hydra, download and so on) work normally on AIX.

Some common Unix commands produce AIX-specific output instead of Linux format: ps (shows swiftd, db2sysc, clstrmgr and the like), df (disk usage in GB with JFS2 filesystem type), who (login sessions with pts/ terminals), mount (the AIX mount table), uname (AIX system identification string) and hostname.

AIX uses LVM to manage storage. Each mainframe has 3 volume groups:

Volume group What it holds
rootvg System volumes (/, /usr, /var, /tmp, /home)
datavg Database and financial data (/data/db2, /data/ledger, /data/audit)
swiftvg SWIFT payment system (/swift/transfers, /swift/archive)

Key commands: lspv (physical volumes), lsvg (volume groups), lsvg -l rootvg (logical volumes within a VG).

Type smit or smitty to open the AIX administration menu. Navigate with numbered options:

Option Menu
1 System Environments
2 Devices
3 Storage / LVM
4 Network Configuration
5 Security & Users
6 Problem Determination
7 Performance

Navigation: back or f3 to go up, quit or f10 to exit SMIT. SMIT is useful for recon: it surfaces user lists, LVM layout, error reports and network config through a menu-driven interface.

The SWIFT payment system is protected by LVM mirroring. Before you can edit SWIFT messages, you must break the mirror:

Command What it does
rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers Remove the mirror from the SWIFT transfers LV
unmirrorvg swiftvg Remove all mirrors in the SWIFT volume group

Either command unlocks the SWIFT message editor. Without breaking the mirror, the editor shows: “Data integrity enforced: LVM mirror active.”

Type swift or smit swift to launch the SWIFT Alliance Access 7.3 terminal, a fully interactive banking payment system.

Option What it does
[1] Messaging Queue Browse pending payment messages
[2] Message Editor Edit ISO 20022 pain.001 messages (requires mirror break)
[3] RMA Exchange View Relationship Management Application keys (read-only)
[4] System Monitor Queue stats, HSM status, SWIFTNet link (read-only)
[5] Audit Trail View all SWIFT operations logged this session

Shows 8 to 12 pending payment messages with TX ID, sender/receiver BICs, amounts (EUR/USD/GBP/CHF/JPY) and status (HELD, PENDING RMA, VALIDATED). Enter a TX ID to select a message for editing.

A field-by-field ISO 20022 editor with 8 fields:

Field Field
[1] Sender BIC [5] Debtor Account (IBAN)
[2] Receiver BIC [6] Creditor Account (IBAN)
[3] Message ID [7] Amount
[4] Creation DateTime [8] Purpose

The [EDIT<-] marker shows the active field. Navigate with next / prev to move between fields, 1-8 to jump to a specific field, or type a value to replace the current field’s content.

Editor actions:

Command What it does
validate Check all fields against the ISO 20022 schema
release Sign and submit the message (validates first)
hold Place the message on hold
abort Abort the message
back Return to the queue without changes

Validation rules: a BIC is 8 or 11 characters (4 alpha bank + 2 alpha country + 2-5 alphanum); an IBAN is 5-34 characters, starts with 2 letters + 2 digits and passes the MOD-97 check; an Amount is a positive number with up to 2 decimal places; a MsgId is 1-35 alphanumeric characters. Failed validation shows specific errors per field, and release validates before submitting, so invalid messages cannot be released.

The typical attack flow on a mainframe:

1. SIGINT recon: lock a banking employee in the Signal Decoupler, intercept their financial intel
2. Intercept the SWIFT MFA authorization code (SI >= 80%)
3. Exploit the mainframe (metasploit with an AIX-PowerHA CVE)
4. Connect to the mainframe (connect <ip>)
5. Recon with lsvg -l swiftvg to find the mirror layout
6. Break the mirror: rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers
7. Launch SWIFT: swift
8. Browse the queue, select a transaction
9. Edit fields (redirect funds by changing creditor BIC/IBAN)
10. Validate and release the modified message (requires intercepted MFA)
11. Check the audit trail, then clean up with logcleaner

Type base24 to launch the ACI BASE24-eps ATM switch controller, a real-world ISO 8583 terminal management platform used by hundreds of banks.

Option What it does
[1] ATM Terminal Status View connected ATM terminals and their status
[2] Fraud Detection Rules Modify withdrawal limits, velocity checks, geo-fence alerts
[3] Transaction Authorization Initiate mass cashout (requires fraud rules disabled)
[4] Alert Queue View and manage SOC fraud alerts
[5] Audit Log View all BASE24 operations logged this session
1. Lock the SOC analyst in SIGINT, tune to SI >= 50%
2. Execute the HLR/VLR Deregistration exploit to burn their phone
3. Break the LVM mirror: rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers
4. Launch BASE24: base24
5. Open Fraud Detection Rules (option 2)
6. Set the withdrawal limit: 1 999999
7. Disable velocity checking: 2 disable
8. Disable geo-fence alerts: 3 disable
9. Apply changes: apply
10. Select Transaction Authorization (option 3), requires the SOC phone burned
11. Start the cashout: cashout <city_id>
12. Suppress backup SOC alerts within 30 seconds: suppress <alert_id>

During the 150-second cashout window, SOC backup alerts arrive in waves. Each appears with a countdown:

[!] FRD-0001: Velocity anomaly detected: SUPPRESS WITHIN 25s

Type suppress <alert_id> to dismiss it before the deadline:

suppress FRD-0001

You have 30 seconds per alert. Keep pressing Enter to refresh the display and watch for new alerts.

With the SOC phone burned, only 2 backup alert waves arrive (at roughly 80s and 130s) instead of 4. Payout scales with elapsed time: the longer the cashout runs, the more BTC you earn.

For high-value targets, intercept banking employee comms via SIGINT first. Financial transactions intercepted from Finance-sector employees reference real SWIFT queue entries (matching TX IDs, BICs and amounts). MFA authorization is required for message release: intercept a SWIFT Alliance auth code in the Signal Decoupler (Correlation tab), then release the modified payment within the code’s 5-minute window. The app’s financial-intelligence summary correlates intercepted Finance-sector comms with the SWIFT mainframe.

For ATM cashout missions, lock the SOC analyst in SIGINT (SI >= 50%) and execute the HLR/VLR Deregistration exploit (hlr_vlr_dereg) to burn their phone. This prevents mobile fraud alerts and is required before initiating a cashout in BASE24.

The AIX prompt uses ksh style: hostname:cwd # for root, hostname:cwd $ for a user. Tab completion works for all AIX commands.