AIX Mainframes
Banking domains do not run Linux. They run IBM AIX 7.3 on Power Systems hardware, and when you connect to one you land in a ksh (Korn Shell) environment, not bash. These are high-security financial infrastructure targets with their own tooling, a SWIFT payment terminal and an ATM switch controller. They are the deep end of the game.
Identifying mainframes
Section titled “Identifying mainframes”Mainframes (BANK_MAINFRAME) appear on 13 specific banking domains (for example treasury.ledger.gov, offshore.bank.is, vertex.finance.com). Look for:
| Signal | Value |
|---|---|
| Hostname prefix | mf-01.* |
| Service | AIX-PowerHA (port 4889) |
| VLAN | SECRET |
| OS fingerprint | IBM AIX 7.3 TL2 (Power Systems) |
| Architecture | ppc64 |
Exploiting AIX
Section titled “Exploiting AIX”Two CVEs target the AIX-PowerHA service:
| CVE | What it is |
|---|---|
| CVE-2024-22329 | HTTP Request Smuggling |
| CVE-2023-45168 | nimvrmgr Command Injection |
Use searchsploit AIX or searchsploit PowerHA to find them, then exploit with metasploit as usual.
AIX-native commands
Section titled “AIX-native commands”These commands only work on AIX mainframes:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
lsdev -Cc disk/adapter/processor |
List hardware devices by class |
lspv |
List physical volumes (hdisk0, hdisk1, …) |
lsvg [-l vgname] |
List volume groups, or LVs within a VG |
odmget -q "name=hdisk0" CuAt |
Query ODM device attributes |
errpt [-a] |
System error report (summary or detailed) |
lsattr -El <device> |
Device attributes (sys0, hdisk0, etc.) |
topas |
Performance monitor (CPU, memory, disk, network) |
oslevel -s |
Show AIX version (e.g. 7300-02-01-2425) |
svmon -G |
Global memory statistics |
bootlist -m normal |
Boot device order |
lslpp -l [pattern] |
List installed packages/filesets |
instfix -i |
List applied security fixes (APARs) |
vmo -a |
VM tunables |
lssrc -a |
List subsystem status (AIX service manager) |
cfgmgr |
Configuration manager |
Linux commands on AIX
Section titled “Linux commands on AIX”Common Linux commands are not available. Typing one shows a hint with the AIX equivalent:
| Linux | AIX equivalent |
|---|---|
systemctl |
lssrc -a |
apt / yum |
installp / smit install |
ip addr |
ifconfig -a |
lspci |
lsdev -Cc adapter |
journalctl |
errpt |
free |
svmon -G |
top |
topas |
lsblk |
lspv / lsvg |
Hacking toolkit commands (nmap, metasploit, hydra, download and so on) work normally on AIX.
AIX-flavored output
Section titled “AIX-flavored output”Some common Unix commands produce AIX-specific output instead of Linux format: ps (shows swiftd, db2sysc, clstrmgr and the like), df (disk usage in GB with JFS2 filesystem type), who (login sessions with pts/ terminals), mount (the AIX mount table), uname (AIX system identification string) and hostname.
LVM: Logical Volume Manager
Section titled “LVM: Logical Volume Manager”AIX uses LVM to manage storage. Each mainframe has 3 volume groups:
| Volume group | What it holds |
|---|---|
rootvg |
System volumes (/, /usr, /var, /tmp, /home) |
datavg |
Database and financial data (/data/db2, /data/ledger, /data/audit) |
swiftvg |
SWIFT payment system (/swift/transfers, /swift/archive) |
Key commands: lspv (physical volumes), lsvg (volume groups), lsvg -l rootvg (logical volumes within a VG).
SMIT: System Management Interface Tool
Section titled “SMIT: System Management Interface Tool”Type smit or smitty to open the AIX administration menu. Navigate with numbered options:
| Option | Menu |
|---|---|
| 1 | System Environments |
| 2 | Devices |
| 3 | Storage / LVM |
| 4 | Network Configuration |
| 5 | Security & Users |
| 6 | Problem Determination |
| 7 | Performance |
Navigation: back or f3 to go up, quit or f10 to exit SMIT. SMIT is useful for recon: it surfaces user lists, LVM layout, error reports and network config through a menu-driven interface.
Mirror break gate
Section titled “Mirror break gate”The SWIFT payment system is protected by LVM mirroring. Before you can edit SWIFT messages, you must break the mirror:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers |
Remove the mirror from the SWIFT transfers LV |
unmirrorvg swiftvg |
Remove all mirrors in the SWIFT volume group |
Either command unlocks the SWIFT message editor. Without breaking the mirror, the editor shows: “Data integrity enforced: LVM mirror active.”
SWIFT Alliance Access CLI
Section titled “SWIFT Alliance Access CLI”Type swift or smit swift to launch the SWIFT Alliance Access 7.3 terminal, a fully interactive banking payment system.
| Option | What it does |
|---|---|
| [1] Messaging Queue | Browse pending payment messages |
| [2] Message Editor | Edit ISO 20022 pain.001 messages (requires mirror break) |
| [3] RMA Exchange | View Relationship Management Application keys (read-only) |
| [4] System Monitor | Queue stats, HSM status, SWIFTNet link (read-only) |
| [5] Audit Trail | View all SWIFT operations logged this session |
Messaging Queue
Section titled “Messaging Queue”Shows 8 to 12 pending payment messages with TX ID, sender/receiver BICs, amounts (EUR/USD/GBP/CHF/JPY) and status (HELD, PENDING RMA, VALIDATED). Enter a TX ID to select a message for editing.
Message Editor (pain.001)
Section titled “Message Editor (pain.001)”A field-by-field ISO 20022 editor with 8 fields:
| Field | Field |
|---|---|
| [1] Sender BIC | [5] Debtor Account (IBAN) |
| [2] Receiver BIC | [6] Creditor Account (IBAN) |
| [3] Message ID | [7] Amount |
| [4] Creation DateTime | [8] Purpose |
The [EDIT<-] marker shows the active field. Navigate with next / prev to move between fields, 1-8 to jump to a specific field, or type a value to replace the current field’s content.
Editor actions:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
validate |
Check all fields against the ISO 20022 schema |
release |
Sign and submit the message (validates first) |
hold |
Place the message on hold |
abort |
Abort the message |
back |
Return to the queue without changes |
Validation rules: a BIC is 8 or 11 characters (4 alpha bank + 2 alpha country + 2-5 alphanum); an IBAN is 5-34 characters, starts with 2 letters + 2 digits and passes the MOD-97 check; an Amount is a positive number with up to 2 decimal places; a MsgId is 1-35 alphanumeric characters. Failed validation shows specific errors per field, and release validates before submitting, so invalid messages cannot be released.
SWIFT workflow
Section titled “SWIFT workflow”The typical attack flow on a mainframe:
1. SIGINT recon: lock a banking employee in the Signal Decoupler, intercept their financial intel2. Intercept the SWIFT MFA authorization code (SI >= 80%)3. Exploit the mainframe (metasploit with an AIX-PowerHA CVE)4. Connect to the mainframe (connect <ip>)5. Recon with lsvg -l swiftvg to find the mirror layout6. Break the mirror: rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers7. Launch SWIFT: swift8. Browse the queue, select a transaction9. Edit fields (redirect funds by changing creditor BIC/IBAN)10. Validate and release the modified message (requires intercepted MFA)11. Check the audit trail, then clean up with logcleanerBASE24-eps ATM switch controller
Section titled “BASE24-eps ATM switch controller”Type base24 to launch the ACI BASE24-eps ATM switch controller, a real-world ISO 8583 terminal management platform used by hundreds of banks.
| Option | What it does |
|---|---|
| [1] ATM Terminal Status | View connected ATM terminals and their status |
| [2] Fraud Detection Rules | Modify withdrawal limits, velocity checks, geo-fence alerts |
| [3] Transaction Authorization | Initiate mass cashout (requires fraud rules disabled) |
| [4] Alert Queue | View and manage SOC fraud alerts |
| [5] Audit Log | View all BASE24 operations logged this session |
ATM cashout flow
Section titled “ATM cashout flow”1. Lock the SOC analyst in SIGINT, tune to SI >= 50%2. Execute the HLR/VLR Deregistration exploit to burn their phone3. Break the LVM mirror: rmlvcopy lv_swift_transfers4. Launch BASE24: base245. Open Fraud Detection Rules (option 2)6. Set the withdrawal limit: 1 9999997. Disable velocity checking: 2 disable8. Disable geo-fence alerts: 3 disable9. Apply changes: apply10. Select Transaction Authorization (option 3), requires the SOC phone burned11. Start the cashout: cashout <city_id>12. Suppress backup SOC alerts within 30 seconds: suppress <alert_id>Suppressing alerts
Section titled “Suppressing alerts”During the 150-second cashout window, SOC backup alerts arrive in waves. Each appears with a countdown:
[!] FRD-0001: Velocity anomaly detected: SUPPRESS WITHIN 25sType suppress <alert_id> to dismiss it before the deadline:
suppress FRD-0001You have 30 seconds per alert. Keep pressing Enter to refresh the display and watch for new alerts.
With the SOC phone burned, only 2 backup alert waves arrive (at roughly 80s and 130s) instead of 4. Payout scales with elapsed time: the longer the cashout runs, the more BTC you earn.
SIGINT integration
Section titled “SIGINT integration”For high-value targets, intercept banking employee comms via SIGINT first. Financial transactions intercepted from Finance-sector employees reference real SWIFT queue entries (matching TX IDs, BICs and amounts). MFA authorization is required for message release: intercept a SWIFT Alliance auth code in the Signal Decoupler (Correlation tab), then release the modified payment within the code’s 5-minute window. The app’s financial-intelligence summary correlates intercepted Finance-sector comms with the SWIFT mainframe.
For ATM cashout missions, lock the SOC analyst in SIGINT (SI >= 50%) and execute the HLR/VLR Deregistration exploit (hlr_vlr_dereg) to burn their phone. This prevents mobile fraud alerts and is required before initiating a cashout in BASE24.
Prompt
Section titled “Prompt”The AIX prompt uses ksh style: hostname:cwd # for root, hostname:cwd $ for a user. Tab completion works for all AIX commands.
Related pages
Section titled “Related pages”- The Hacking Pipeline: the breach loop that gets you onto the mainframe.
- Network & Devices: other non-Linux appliances (Cisco IOS, NetScaler, pfSense) and their native shells.
- Lateral Movement: pivoting onto the SECRET VLAN where mainframes live.
