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Network & Devices

The NODE network is not one kind of box. Behind every gateway sits a LAN of workstations, servers, appliances and infrastructure, and many of them do not speak bash. This page covers the devices you meet once you are inside, how to reach what is hidden, and the native shells each one drops you into.

Device What it is
Servers & gateways Gateways, LAN nodes, and server tiers and defenses
VLAN segmentation Isolated VLANs and the managed switch that bridges them
Switches (Cisco IOS) IOS mode hierarchy, privileged access and SSH pivoting
Vendor access points Wireless APs and what they gate
Citrix NetScaler The two exploits, the two shells, where the files live
pfSense firewalls The console menu and the loot behind option 8
Windows machines cmd.exe vs PowerShell, privilege escalation, antivirus, logs

For older Windows (NT 4.0, 2000) and other legacy boxes, see Legacy OS Servers.

The NODE network spans roughly 250 gateways across multiple domains, with more than 2400 internal LAN nodes behind them.

Gateways are the entry points into corporate and institutional networks. Each gateway belongs to a domain (for example volkov-energy.ru or nexacore.com) and exposes public-facing services. Browse discovered gateways in the World Map application.

Behind each gateway lies an internal network of devices:

Node What it is
WORKSTATION Employee desktops (Linux, Win7, Win10): credentials, wallets
SERVER Internal servers, databases, file shares
WEB Web applications, sqlmap target (hydra --url first)
DB Database servers, sqlmap target (--dbms-creds required)
MAIL Mail servers, employee communications
CCTV Surveillance cameras, viewable via cctv_view
PRINTER Network printers, spool data, credentials
PLC Industrial controllers, sabotage targets
SWITCH Network switches, deauth targets
MOBILE Mobile phones, discoverable via wifi_crack

LAN discovery is blocked by the gateway’s firewall by default. You must disable it before internal nodes become visible:

  1. Exploit the gateway and open its admin panel in the web browser.
  2. Go to the Firewall Rules tab.
  3. Find and disable the rule blocking internal access.
  4. Run netdiscover, nmap <subnet>/24, or cat /etc/hosts to reveal LAN devices.

Without disabling the firewall, these commands return an error or warning instead of discovering internal nodes.

Servers range from Tier 1 (easy) to Tier 6 (hardened). Higher tiers have stronger defenses and better loot, and new tiers unlock as you complete missions and build trust.

Tier Defenses
Tier 3+ Firewalls: block internal network access, filter ports
Tier 5+ IDS (Intrusion Detection): detects scans and exploits

IDS on Tier 5+ servers can catch nmap scans and metasploit exploits. Use stealth scan types (-sS or -sN) to lower detection risk on hardened targets. See Scanning & Stealth for the full detection model.

Higher-tier networks do not run flat. Their internal devices are split into isolated VLAN segments, each a walled-off pocket of the LAN that cannot see the others. Breaching the gateway firewall only shows you some devices: the rest stay hidden behind infrastructure you have not touched yet.

The device that controls VLAN segmentation is the managed switch. It decides which ports talk to which segments, so if you want to reach what is behind it you have to deal with it directly.

Start with recon. SNMP is often exposed on these devices, and a well-placed snmpwalk can map the topology before you commit to anything loud.

Once you have access, explore the switch filesystem. Network engineers store their configurations somewhere: VLAN mappings, port assignments, routing tables. Finding these reveals the segments and what sits on them. Think like a network admin and look where they would keep their config.

Like gateways, managed switches have web admin panels. Root access on the switch auto-authenticates with full admin privileges, including SPAN port mirroring. Without root, use hydra --url for limited user-level access.

A managed switch sits at the center of the network, so once compromised it is a powerful pivot point with trunk access across all segments.

When you drop a shell on a MANAGED_SWITCH (sessions -i <N> then shell in msfconsole, or ssh <user>@<ip> with cracked credentials), you land in a Cisco IOS command-line interface instead of a Linux shell. This is the switch’s native operating system. There is no bash prompt.

GATEWAY_CISCO devices also run IOS (IOS-XE on Catalyst, ISR and ASR platforms), but the shell drop lands you on the underlying Linux base instead. There, type cisco-shell to reach the IOS CLI: it is the only way in. The same command takes you back into IOS on a switch if you dropped to bash. Any other device type refuses it.

The IOS CLI uses a privilege mode system. Each mode unlocks different commands:

Prompt Mode
> User EXEC: read-only, basic show commands
# Privileged EXEC: full access, config, shell
(config)# Global Configuration: system-wide changes
(config-if)# Interface Configuration: per-port changes

If you exploit the switch with root access, you enter Privileged EXEC automatically. Otherwise you start in User EXEC and must escalate with enable, which prompts for the enable password. Crack it with john /etc/shadow on the switch first, and look for “admin” or “enable” user credentials.

Command What it does
show version IOS version, model, serial, uptime
show running-config Full switch configuration (enable secret hash visible)
show vlan brief VLAN table, reveals VLANs
show interfaces status Port-to-device-to-VLAN mapping
show mac address-table MAC address recon
show cdp neighbors Connected device discovery (CDP)
show port-security Port security status
show logging Switch syslog

Configuration commands (from Privileged EXEC)

Section titled “Configuration commands (from Privileged EXEC)”
Command What it does
configure terminal Enter global config mode
interface gi0/N Select a port to configure
shutdown Disable a port, blocks all access to that device
no shutdown Re-enable a disabled port
switchport access vlan N Reassign a device to a different VLAN
write memory Save configuration

Real Cisco IOS-XE provides a shell command that drops to a system-level Unix shell. In NODE, this is your escape hatch for running hacking tools:

Command What it does
shell Drops to bash-4.3$, where all Unix and hacking commands work
exit Returns to the IOS CLI (does NOT disconnect)

Use it to run logcleaner, download, linpeas, or any other tool while on the switch.

From Privileged EXEC, ssh <user>@<ip> pivots to another device on the same LAN. You leave IOS and open a real SSH session on the target, using cracked credentials the same way ssh does from your own machine.

exit steps back one mode at a time: (config-if)# to (config)# to # to > to disconnect. end jumps from any config mode directly to Privileged EXEC. disable drops from Privileged to User EXEC.

IOS accepts the shortest unambiguous prefix, just like real Cisco:

Abbreviation Full command
sh run show running-config
sh vl br show vlan brief
conf t configure terminal
int gi0/1 interface GigabitEthernet0/1
en enable
wr write memory
? Context-sensitive help (works in any mode)

Tab auto-completes IOS commands when in IOS mode.

The wireless box on a LAN is not always the same box. It comes in three real vendor flavors, and they do not share exploits. Run searchsploit against it first and let the results tell you which one you are looking at. Guess wrong and you waste a run.

Device OS Shell access Web panel
ACCESS_POINT OpenWrt 23.05.2 (busybox, LuCI) connect or ssh drops into busybox; uci, opkg, ubus, logread work LuCI
UNIFI_CONSOLE UniFi OS (Linux underneath) Normal shell; exposure is a Log4Shell-class flaw on port 8443 that escalates on the host UniFi Network
MIKROTIK_ROUTER RouterOS 6.40.x No shell passthrough: a closed command tree (/system resource print, /export) WebFig

The OpenWrt box is a softer target by tier, but it sits on the network you want. These all sit on the Servers VLAN and are coherent: banner, shell, web panel and CVEs belong to the same vendor, so what searchsploit shows you is what the box actually is.

Corporate and government VPN gateways. Under the hood, a FreeBSD appliance running the proprietary NetScaler packet engine, with its own CLI, file layout and login banner. When nmap tells you Citrix ADC nsppe on 80/443, you have found one.

Both are real, both are famous, both are in metasploit:

CVE What it is
CVE-2019-19781 “Shitrix”: path traversal that writes an XML template the appliance runs on retrieval. Unauth RCE as root.
CVE-2023-3519 Stack buffer overflow in the SAML/gateway handler. Unauth RCE as root, CVSS 9.8.

The standard breach loop reaches them:

metasploit
search 2023-3519 (or search Citrix)
use 0
set RHOSTS <ip>
exploit
sessions -i 1
shell

Root on a NetScaler gets you a plain shell. To reach the Citrix CLI, type netscaler-shell:

Command What it does
netscaler-shell Enter the NetScaler CLI (nsroot@host>)
show version Build and serial
show run The full running config
show lb vserver Load-balanced virtual servers
show ha HA peer state
shell Drop to the underlying FreeBSD
exit Leave the CLI (or leave BSD back to the CLI)
Path What it holds
/nsconfig/ns.conf The real config: bind mounts, SSL certs, users, backend IPs
/nsconfig/ssl/server.key The SSL private key (rw-------), loot it with download
/netscaler/ nsppe, nsapimgr, nsconmsg, the proprietary binaries
/var/nslog/newnslog Packet-engine log (binary)
/var/log/ns.log Human-readable event log

The nsroot account is the appliance root, and its config sits next to the SSL keys, which is why these boxes are worth breaching.

Half the firewall gateways run pfSense (the rest run FortiOS). pfSense is FreeBSD underneath, and unlike Cisco or NetScaler its admin interface is not a command language, it is a numbered console menu. When nmap reports pfSense on 443/8443, you have found one.

Breach it the normal way:

metasploit
search pfsense
use 0
set RHOSTS <ip>
exploit
sessions -i 1
shell

That lands you in the box’s FreeBSD shell. To bring up the pfSense console menu, type pfsense (it works only on a pfSense box).

The menu is numbered. The two that matter to an operator:

Option What it does
8 Shell Drop to the FreeBSD shell (the firewall config lives there)
3 Reset admin Reset the webConfigurator admin, which hands you the web panel

The rest are faithful flavor: 7 ping, 9 pfTop, 10 filter logs, 13 update check, and so on. exit in the shell returns to the menu; 0 (Logout) disconnects.

Where the interesting files live (from menu option 8)

Section titled “Where the interesting files live (from menu option 8)”
Path What it holds
/etc/firewall/rules.conf The rule base (WAN/LAN/DMZ/VPN zones)
/etc/firewall/nat.conf NAT and the DNAT port-forwards to internal servers
/etc/vpn/ IPsec config, tunnels, and the VPN certificates

Reading the rule base needs root, so escalate first if your foothold landed as a user. Menu option 3 is the shortcut to the web panel when you do not want to hydra --url it.

Some LAN workstations run Windows instead of Linux. When you connect to one, you enter a native Windows shell: cmd.exe (Windows 7) or PowerShell (Windows 10). There is no bash prompt.

nmap <ip> -sV -O reveals the OS fingerprint and Windows-specific ports:

Port Service
3389 RDP (Remote Desktop)
445 SMB (file sharing)
135 MSRPC

Hostnames use the pc-N prefix instead of ws-N for Linux workstations.

Unix commands do NOT work on Windows. Typing ls, cat, grep or sudo returns “not recognized.” Use the native commands:

cmd.exe (Windows 7) PowerShell (Windows 10)
dir Get-ChildItem (or gci)
type <file> Get-Content <file> (or gc)
cd <path> Set-Location <path> (or sl)
ipconfig Get-NetIPConfiguration
tasklist Get-Process (or gps)
netstat -an Get-NetTCPConnection
systeminfo systeminfo
whoami whoami

Hacking toolkit commands (nmap, metasploit, hydra, john, download and so on) work normally on all machines.

Windows machines have unique CVEs:

CVE What it is
CVE-2019-0708 BlueKeep: RDP RCE (Windows 7)
CVE-2020-0796 SMBGhost: SMBv3 overflow (Windows 10)

Use searchsploit RDP or searchsploit SMBv3 to find them, then exploit with metasploit as usual. hydra targets RDP on port 3389 automatically.

Linux tools do not work on Windows. Use the Windows equivalents:

Linux Windows
linpeas winpeas (scan for privesc vectors: unquoted paths, weak services, token abuse)
sudo runas /user:Administrator cmd (requires a winpeas vector found)
kexploit winkexploit (EternalBlue, PrintNightmare, Zerologon, Win32k EoP)
/etc/shadow C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM
john /etc/shadow john SAM (crack NTLM hashes from the SAM file)

Antivirus: Defender and Security Essentials

Section titled “Antivirus: Defender and Security Essentials”

Every Windows workstation runs antivirus. Windows 10 runs Windows Defender; Windows 7 runs Microsoft Security Essentials. Both block noisy operations like download, inject, miner, infect and worm until you turn real-time protection off:

Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true Windows 10 (PowerShell)
sc stop MsMpSvc or net stop MsMpSvc Windows 7

The engine, MsMpEng.exe, is a protected process: taskkill cannot end it. Check it with sc query MsMpSvc. On Windows 7 a stopped service drops MsMpEng.exe from tasklist and takes the castle icon out of the tray; on Windows 10 the service keeps running and the tray shield turns to a red X.

Use Get-MpThreatDetection to check whether Defender flagged anything (Windows 10).

PowerShell on Windows 10 has tools that cmd.exe does not:

Command What it does
Invoke-Mimikatz Dump credentials from LSASS memory (requires SYSTEM)
Get-EventLog Read Windows Event Logs (Security, Application, System)
net user /domain List all Active Directory users in the domain

Invoke-Mimikatz extracts NTLM hashes and plaintext passwords, with the same cross-machine reuse mechanic as john.

Windows machines track activity in Event Logs instead of /var/log:

Log What it records
Security.evtx Login attempts, credential use
Application.evtx Application errors
System.evtx System events, service changes

Clear them with logcleaner --winevt, or logcleaner --all to handle both Linux and Windows logs. Read them with wevtutil qe Security (cmd) or Get-EventLog -LogName Security (PowerShell).

Browse to a Windows IP in the web browser to reach the RDP panel. Authentication follows the same rules as other device panels, and terminal exploits auto-unlock access. Available actions: Download SAM Hashes, View Event Logs, Screenshot Desktop, and Disable Defender (Windows 10).

Windows machines joined to a domain contain AD artifacts:

Artifact What it shows
net user /domain All domain users across machines
C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\ Domain join configuration
C:\Users\...\Credentials\ Cached credential references

Use these to map employee accounts across the target network and find password reuse opportunities.