Network & Devices
The NODE network is not one kind of box. Behind every gateway sits a LAN of workstations, servers, appliances and infrastructure, and many of them do not speak bash. This page covers the devices you meet once you are inside, how to reach what is hidden, and the native shells each one drops you into.
| Device | What it is |
|---|---|
| Servers & gateways | Gateways, LAN nodes, and server tiers and defenses |
| VLAN segmentation | Isolated VLANs and the managed switch that bridges them |
| Switches (Cisco IOS) | IOS mode hierarchy, privileged access and SSH pivoting |
| Vendor access points | Wireless APs and what they gate |
| Citrix NetScaler | The two exploits, the two shells, where the files live |
| pfSense firewalls | The console menu and the loot behind option 8 |
| Windows machines | cmd.exe vs PowerShell, privilege escalation, antivirus, logs |
For older Windows (NT 4.0, 2000) and other legacy boxes, see Legacy OS Servers.
Network & servers
Section titled “Network & servers”The NODE network spans roughly 250 gateways across multiple domains, with more than 2400 internal LAN nodes behind them.
Gateways
Section titled “Gateways”Gateways are the entry points into corporate and institutional networks. Each gateway belongs to a domain (for example volkov-energy.ru or nexacore.com) and exposes public-facing services. Browse discovered gateways in the World Map application.
LAN nodes
Section titled “LAN nodes”Behind each gateway lies an internal network of devices:
| Node | What it is |
|---|---|
| WORKSTATION | Employee desktops (Linux, Win7, Win10): credentials, wallets |
| SERVER | Internal servers, databases, file shares |
| WEB | Web applications, sqlmap target (hydra --url first) |
| DB | Database servers, sqlmap target (--dbms-creds required) |
| Mail servers, employee communications | |
| CCTV | Surveillance cameras, viewable via cctv_view |
| PRINTER | Network printers, spool data, credentials |
| PLC | Industrial controllers, sabotage targets |
| SWITCH | Network switches, deauth targets |
| MOBILE | Mobile phones, discoverable via wifi_crack |
Discovering LAN nodes
Section titled “Discovering LAN nodes”LAN discovery is blocked by the gateway’s firewall by default. You must disable it before internal nodes become visible:
- Exploit the gateway and open its admin panel in the web browser.
- Go to the Firewall Rules tab.
- Find and disable the rule blocking internal access.
- Run
netdiscover,nmap <subnet>/24, orcat /etc/hoststo reveal LAN devices.
Without disabling the firewall, these commands return an error or warning instead of discovering internal nodes.
Server tiers and defenses
Section titled “Server tiers and defenses”Servers range from Tier 1 (easy) to Tier 6 (hardened). Higher tiers have stronger defenses and better loot, and new tiers unlock as you complete missions and build trust.
| Tier | Defenses |
|---|---|
| Tier 3+ | Firewalls: block internal network access, filter ports |
| Tier 5+ | IDS (Intrusion Detection): detects scans and exploits |
IDS on Tier 5+ servers can catch nmap scans and metasploit exploits. Use stealth scan types (-sS or -sN) to lower detection risk on hardened targets. See Scanning & Stealth for the full detection model.
VLAN segmentation
Section titled “VLAN segmentation”Higher-tier networks do not run flat. Their internal devices are split into isolated VLAN segments, each a walled-off pocket of the LAN that cannot see the others. Breaching the gateway firewall only shows you some devices: the rest stay hidden behind infrastructure you have not touched yet.
The managed switch
Section titled “The managed switch”The device that controls VLAN segmentation is the managed switch. It decides which ports talk to which segments, so if you want to reach what is behind it you have to deal with it directly.
Start with recon. SNMP is often exposed on these devices, and a well-placed snmpwalk can map the topology before you commit to anything loud.
Once you have access, explore the switch filesystem. Network engineers store their configurations somewhere: VLAN mappings, port assignments, routing tables. Finding these reveals the segments and what sits on them. Think like a network admin and look where they would keep their config.
Like gateways, managed switches have web admin panels. Root access on the switch auto-authenticates with full admin privileges, including SPAN port mirroring. Without root, use hydra --url for limited user-level access.
A managed switch sits at the center of the network, so once compromised it is a powerful pivot point with trunk access across all segments.
Switches (Cisco IOS)
Section titled “Switches (Cisco IOS)”When you drop a shell on a MANAGED_SWITCH (sessions -i <N> then shell in msfconsole, or ssh <user>@<ip> with cracked credentials), you land in a Cisco IOS command-line interface instead of a Linux shell. This is the switch’s native operating system. There is no bash prompt.
GATEWAY_CISCO devices also run IOS (IOS-XE on Catalyst, ISR and ASR platforms), but the shell drop lands you on the underlying Linux base instead. There, type cisco-shell to reach the IOS CLI: it is the only way in. The same command takes you back into IOS on a switch if you dropped to bash. Any other device type refuses it.
Mode hierarchy
Section titled “Mode hierarchy”The IOS CLI uses a privilege mode system. Each mode unlocks different commands:
| Prompt | Mode |
|---|---|
> |
User EXEC: read-only, basic show commands |
# |
Privileged EXEC: full access, config, shell |
(config)# |
Global Configuration: system-wide changes |
(config-if)# |
Interface Configuration: per-port changes |
Getting privileged access
Section titled “Getting privileged access”If you exploit the switch with root access, you enter Privileged EXEC automatically. Otherwise you start in User EXEC and must escalate with enable, which prompts for the enable password. Crack it with john /etc/shadow on the switch first, and look for “admin” or “enable” user credentials.
Show commands
Section titled “Show commands”| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
show version |
IOS version, model, serial, uptime |
show running-config |
Full switch configuration (enable secret hash visible) |
show vlan brief |
VLAN table, reveals VLANs |
show interfaces status |
Port-to-device-to-VLAN mapping |
show mac address-table |
MAC address recon |
show cdp neighbors |
Connected device discovery (CDP) |
show port-security |
Port security status |
show logging |
Switch syslog |
Configuration commands (from Privileged EXEC)
Section titled “Configuration commands (from Privileged EXEC)”| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
configure terminal |
Enter global config mode |
interface gi0/N |
Select a port to configure |
shutdown |
Disable a port, blocks all access to that device |
no shutdown |
Re-enable a disabled port |
switchport access vlan N |
Reassign a device to a different VLAN |
write memory |
Save configuration |
Unix shell escape
Section titled “Unix shell escape”Real Cisco IOS-XE provides a shell command that drops to a system-level Unix shell. In NODE, this is your escape hatch for running hacking tools:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
shell |
Drops to bash-4.3$, where all Unix and hacking commands work |
exit |
Returns to the IOS CLI (does NOT disconnect) |
Use it to run logcleaner, download, linpeas, or any other tool while on the switch.
SSH pivoting
Section titled “SSH pivoting”From Privileged EXEC, ssh <user>@<ip> pivots to another device on the same LAN. You leave IOS and open a real SSH session on the target, using cracked credentials the same way ssh does from your own machine.
Exit behavior and abbreviations
Section titled “Exit behavior and abbreviations”exit steps back one mode at a time: (config-if)# to (config)# to # to > to disconnect. end jumps from any config mode directly to Privileged EXEC. disable drops from Privileged to User EXEC.
IOS accepts the shortest unambiguous prefix, just like real Cisco:
| Abbreviation | Full command |
|---|---|
sh run |
show running-config |
sh vl br |
show vlan brief |
conf t |
configure terminal |
int gi0/1 |
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 |
en |
enable |
wr |
write memory |
? |
Context-sensitive help (works in any mode) |
Tab auto-completes IOS commands when in IOS mode.
Vendor access points
Section titled “Vendor access points”The wireless box on a LAN is not always the same box. It comes in three real vendor flavors, and they do not share exploits. Run searchsploit against it first and let the results tell you which one you are looking at. Guess wrong and you waste a run.
| Device | OS | Shell access | Web panel |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACCESS_POINT | OpenWrt 23.05.2 (busybox, LuCI) | connect or ssh drops into busybox; uci, opkg, ubus, logread work |
LuCI |
| UNIFI_CONSOLE | UniFi OS (Linux underneath) | Normal shell; exposure is a Log4Shell-class flaw on port 8443 that escalates on the host | UniFi Network |
| MIKROTIK_ROUTER | RouterOS 6.40.x | No shell passthrough: a closed command tree (/system resource print, /export) |
WebFig |
The OpenWrt box is a softer target by tier, but it sits on the network you want. These all sit on the Servers VLAN and are coherent: banner, shell, web panel and CVEs belong to the same vendor, so what searchsploit shows you is what the box actually is.
Citrix NetScaler
Section titled “Citrix NetScaler”Corporate and government VPN gateways. Under the hood, a FreeBSD appliance running the proprietary NetScaler packet engine, with its own CLI, file layout and login banner. When nmap tells you Citrix ADC nsppe on 80/443, you have found one.
The two exploits
Section titled “The two exploits”Both are real, both are famous, both are in metasploit:
| CVE | What it is |
|---|---|
| CVE-2019-19781 | “Shitrix”: path traversal that writes an XML template the appliance runs on retrieval. Unauth RCE as root. |
| CVE-2023-3519 | Stack buffer overflow in the SAML/gateway handler. Unauth RCE as root, CVSS 9.8. |
The standard breach loop reaches them:
metasploitsearch 2023-3519 (or search Citrix)use 0set RHOSTS <ip>exploitsessions -i 1shellThe two shells
Section titled “The two shells”Root on a NetScaler gets you a plain shell. To reach the Citrix CLI, type netscaler-shell:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
netscaler-shell |
Enter the NetScaler CLI (nsroot@host>) |
show version |
Build and serial |
show run |
The full running config |
show lb vserver |
Load-balanced virtual servers |
show ha |
HA peer state |
shell |
Drop to the underlying FreeBSD |
exit |
Leave the CLI (or leave BSD back to the CLI) |
Where the interesting files live
Section titled “Where the interesting files live”| Path | What it holds |
|---|---|
/nsconfig/ns.conf |
The real config: bind mounts, SSL certs, users, backend IPs |
/nsconfig/ssl/server.key |
The SSL private key (rw-------), loot it with download |
/netscaler/ |
nsppe, nsapimgr, nsconmsg, the proprietary binaries |
/var/nslog/newnslog |
Packet-engine log (binary) |
/var/log/ns.log |
Human-readable event log |
The nsroot account is the appliance root, and its config sits next to the SSL keys, which is why these boxes are worth breaching.
pfSense firewalls
Section titled “pfSense firewalls”Half the firewall gateways run pfSense (the rest run FortiOS). pfSense is FreeBSD underneath, and unlike Cisco or NetScaler its admin interface is not a command language, it is a numbered console menu. When nmap reports pfSense on 443/8443, you have found one.
Breach it the normal way:
metasploitsearch pfsenseuse 0set RHOSTS <ip>exploitsessions -i 1shellThat lands you in the box’s FreeBSD shell. To bring up the pfSense console menu, type pfsense (it works only on a pfSense box).
The menu
Section titled “The menu”The menu is numbered. The two that matter to an operator:
| Option | What it does |
|---|---|
| 8 Shell | Drop to the FreeBSD shell (the firewall config lives there) |
| 3 Reset admin | Reset the webConfigurator admin, which hands you the web panel |
The rest are faithful flavor: 7 ping, 9 pfTop, 10 filter logs, 13 update check, and so on. exit in the shell returns to the menu; 0 (Logout) disconnects.
Where the interesting files live (from menu option 8)
Section titled “Where the interesting files live (from menu option 8)”| Path | What it holds |
|---|---|
/etc/firewall/rules.conf |
The rule base (WAN/LAN/DMZ/VPN zones) |
/etc/firewall/nat.conf |
NAT and the DNAT port-forwards to internal servers |
/etc/vpn/ |
IPsec config, tunnels, and the VPN certificates |
Reading the rule base needs root, so escalate first if your foothold landed as a user. Menu option 3 is the shortcut to the web panel when you do not want to hydra --url it.
Windows machines
Section titled “Windows machines”Some LAN workstations run Windows instead of Linux. When you connect to one, you enter a native Windows shell: cmd.exe (Windows 7) or PowerShell (Windows 10). There is no bash prompt.
Identifying Windows machines
Section titled “Identifying Windows machines”nmap <ip> -sV -O reveals the OS fingerprint and Windows-specific ports:
| Port | Service |
|---|---|
| 3389 | RDP (Remote Desktop) |
| 445 | SMB (file sharing) |
| 135 | MSRPC |
Hostnames use the pc-N prefix instead of ws-N for Linux workstations.
Shell differences
Section titled “Shell differences”Unix commands do NOT work on Windows. Typing ls, cat, grep or sudo returns “not recognized.” Use the native commands:
| cmd.exe (Windows 7) | PowerShell (Windows 10) |
|---|---|
dir |
Get-ChildItem (or gci) |
type <file> |
Get-Content <file> (or gc) |
cd <path> |
Set-Location <path> (or sl) |
ipconfig |
Get-NetIPConfiguration |
tasklist |
Get-Process (or gps) |
netstat -an |
Get-NetTCPConnection |
systeminfo |
systeminfo |
whoami |
whoami |
Hacking toolkit commands (nmap, metasploit, hydra, john, download and so on) work normally on all machines.
Exploiting Windows
Section titled “Exploiting Windows”Windows machines have unique CVEs:
| CVE | What it is |
|---|---|
| CVE-2019-0708 | BlueKeep: RDP RCE (Windows 7) |
| CVE-2020-0796 | SMBGhost: SMBv3 overflow (Windows 10) |
Use searchsploit RDP or searchsploit SMBv3 to find them, then exploit with metasploit as usual. hydra targets RDP on port 3389 automatically.
Privilege escalation
Section titled “Privilege escalation”Linux tools do not work on Windows. Use the Windows equivalents:
| Linux | Windows |
|---|---|
linpeas |
winpeas (scan for privesc vectors: unquoted paths, weak services, token abuse) |
sudo |
runas /user:Administrator cmd (requires a winpeas vector found) |
kexploit |
winkexploit (EternalBlue, PrintNightmare, Zerologon, Win32k EoP) |
/etc/shadow |
C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM |
john /etc/shadow |
john SAM (crack NTLM hashes from the SAM file) |
Antivirus: Defender and Security Essentials
Section titled “Antivirus: Defender and Security Essentials”Every Windows workstation runs antivirus. Windows 10 runs Windows Defender; Windows 7 runs Microsoft Security Essentials. Both block noisy operations like download, inject, miner, infect and worm until you turn real-time protection off:
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true Windows 10 (PowerShell)sc stop MsMpSvc or net stop MsMpSvc Windows 7The engine, MsMpEng.exe, is a protected process: taskkill cannot end it. Check it with sc query MsMpSvc. On Windows 7 a stopped service drops MsMpEng.exe from tasklist and takes the castle icon out of the tray; on Windows 10 the service keeps running and the tray shield turns to a red X.
Use Get-MpThreatDetection to check whether Defender flagged anything (Windows 10).
PowerShell exclusives
Section titled “PowerShell exclusives”PowerShell on Windows 10 has tools that cmd.exe does not:
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
Invoke-Mimikatz |
Dump credentials from LSASS memory (requires SYSTEM) |
Get-EventLog |
Read Windows Event Logs (Security, Application, System) |
net user /domain |
List all Active Directory users in the domain |
Invoke-Mimikatz extracts NTLM hashes and plaintext passwords, with the same cross-machine reuse mechanic as john.
Windows Event Logs
Section titled “Windows Event Logs”Windows machines track activity in Event Logs instead of /var/log:
| Log | What it records |
|---|---|
Security.evtx |
Login attempts, credential use |
Application.evtx |
Application errors |
System.evtx |
System events, service changes |
Clear them with logcleaner --winevt, or logcleaner --all to handle both Linux and Windows logs. Read them with wevtutil qe Security (cmd) or Get-EventLog -LogName Security (PowerShell).
RDP web panel
Section titled “RDP web panel”Browse to a Windows IP in the web browser to reach the RDP panel. Authentication follows the same rules as other device panels, and terminal exploits auto-unlock access. Available actions: Download SAM Hashes, View Event Logs, Screenshot Desktop, and Disable Defender (Windows 10).
Active Directory breadcrumbs
Section titled “Active Directory breadcrumbs”Windows machines joined to a domain contain AD artifacts:
| Artifact | What it shows |
|---|---|
net user /domain |
All domain users across machines |
C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\ |
Domain join configuration |
C:\Users\...\Credentials\ |
Cached credential references |
Use these to map employee accounts across the target network and find password reuse opportunities.
Related pages
Section titled “Related pages”- The Hacking Pipeline: the recon-to-shell loop these devices plug into.
- Lateral Movement: SSH keys, FTP, SMB shares and DNS recon for pivoting across a LAN.
- Scanning & Stealth: how IDS and LAN appliances catch your scans.
- Legacy OS Servers: Solaris, IRIX, OpenVMS, NetWare, NT4/2000 and the AS/400, on the network or behind a terminal server.
